Elf & Safety - all up in the air.

[stockhausen]

No message.

 

[Efour]

Someone will probably be made a sacrificial lamb yes.
THen the next model of Jet liner will come in 10 years time and no one will care.

 

[Minstadave]

IAG recently ordered 200 737 Max's so the industry doesn't seem too bothered at all, let alone in 10 years time.

 

[Feek]

IAG recently ordered 200 737 Max's so the industry doesn't seem too bothered at all, let alone in 10 years time.

Interestingly, did you notice that when they announced it, they didn't mention MAX at all, they just said 737-8 and 737-10.

I have no doubt that the MAX will fly again but I think it'll be quietly renamed.

 

[M1k3H]

Self certification is just fine.

Compared to the European system I think it is better.

The inspectors are personally approved by the FAA on their area of expertise, and employed by aircraft/aerospace firms. They are personally liable for anything they sign off. There's also two inspectors (potentially three) on each item. One checking the item being tested is the right item,(one checking the setup of the test is correct) and one checking the test is done right and is worst case.

Nobody is allowed to induce the inspector in any way to overlook or approve something. I don't know where this is contained in CFR (if there), but if you do it is a federal offence. They would always refuse any meals over a certain amount, so basically sandwiches were fine, but out on dinner they would just plain refuse it, as the paperwork to declare and justify it was too much.

Separate inspectors will then approve items above, so their work will be checked again by other people.

The FAA also can choose to approve things themselves, in which case the inspectors act as advisers, and FAA retains the right to approve or reject anything. This is done if a project is deemed to be new or novel.

Note, the above is for items that are already covered by existing regulations, i.e. substantial amount of similar items exist and sufficient data was examined prior to issuing those regulations.

Furthermore, if an item is not covered by existing regulations, the FAA issue "Special Conditions" papers, which basically means a lot of pre-certification testing with the FAA to determine how to do the certification testing, which is what the Special Conditions will cover. On a relatively low level project (aircraft interiors, rather than whole aircraft), I believe it took the FAA 1.5 years to write the Special conditions for an item my company was developing. During that time we had undertaken a considerable amount of destructive testing, to satisfy the FAA that we had considered all scenarios.

 

[esmozz]

Self certification is just fine.

Clearly not, if it was the 737 Max would never have been approved to fly.

This whole sorry saga will now play out through the courts and when the final conclusion is reached I daresay the exact sequence of events leading to the certification of the aircraft will be a complex one.

Nontheless, I'm confident the the system of self certification as it exists, combined with the cost cutting culture at Boeing will play a large part in leading to the loss of those two aircraft.

 

[M1k3H]

Clearly not, if it was the 737 Max would never have been approved to fly.

This whole sorry saga will now play out through the courts and when the final conclusion is reached I daresay the exact sequence of events leading to the certification of the aircraft will be a complex one.

Nontheless, I'm confident the the system of self certification as it exists, combined with the cost cutting culture at Boeing will play a large part in leading to the loss of those two aircraft.

Clearly not? Where do you base this? On 2 accidents?

the number of accidents has been in decline since records began, and that is with increasing numbers of flights.

So it clearly works. Unless you have evidence to the contrary.

Alternatively, if you can recommend a system that works better that would be great.

EASA's system is not one of self certification (although it is starting to go towards a partial self certification), and cannot function properly due to requiring huge amounts of highly technical personnel.

In all years of testing, I've only once had EASA representatives come along to witness the test, all other times everything was delegated and they just check reports. Whereas with FAA programmes Airworthiness Representatives would always come to see the tests.

Edit: To say that both systems can in theory work very well, however in practice self certification works better. It also put more of the onus on the manufacturer to ensure their systems are safe and as such an additional layer of safety.

 

[Minstadave]

I dont think the two accidents are key here. The fact that the certification process allowed a new system to be installed that significantly altered how a plane flew under certain circumstances, a single sensor failure was able to down an aircraft and it was done on the quiet so as to save money on pilot retraining.

That's what is a worry. Not necessarily due to self certification but inadequate certification in general.

 

[M1k3H]

I dont think the two accidents are key here. The fact that the certification process allowed a new system to be installed that significantly altered how a plane flew under certain circumstances, a single sensor failure was able to down an aircraft and it was done on the quiet so as to save money on pilot retraining.

That's what is a worry.

I'm not disputing that there's something wrong here, or in the process itself. I know that most regulators maintain a risk list of manufacturers, and depending on their previous audits/performance/experience/etc they will choose how often to check in detail or not. With Boeing that risk is probably low, so didn't check that often.

The process also relies on multiple experts to approve a system, from the expert approving a single component to the expert approving the sub-system it goes in and then the expert approving the system it goes in. It seems that at best a few people missed something, or at worst there was a push from above to ignore certain elements.

Mistakes always happen, no process is going to fully stop that, unless you check everything independently, which is going to hinder the industry completely to the point that nobody will be making anything.

 

[esmozz]

Clearly not? Where do you base this? On 2 accidents?

Yes, I'm basing it on 2 catastrophic accidents although only one would be sufficient to call into question the certification process at Boeing.

The graph you've posted is largely meaningless in the specific context of what happened at Boeing. The fact that aviation is overall safer now than 30 years ago does not prove that how the Max was certified was safe.

So it clearly works. Unless you have evidence to the contrary.

Alternatively, if you can recommend a system that works better that would be great.

The fact that 2 aircraft crashed is sufficient evidence. I would have thought that obvious. And how about sufficient independant oversight to ensure such an astonishingly bad idea as MCAS, as it was implemented, never made it past the drawing board.

Edit: To say that both systems can in theory work very well, however in practice self certification works better......

You mean cheaper. The fox guarding the chicken coop. What could possibly go wrong.....

Mistakes always happen, no process is going to fully stop that, unless you check everything independently, which is going to hinder the industry completely to the point that nobody will be making anything.

Mistakes happen?!! Good grief! Mistakes like this should never happen. This was not a subtle flaw which somehow made through a robust certification process, it was mindbendingly bad idea - the result of cost cutting and a far too cosy relationship with the regulator.

 

[M1k3H]

Yes, I'm basing it on 2 catastrophic accidents although only one would be sufficient to call into question the certification process at Boeing.

The graph you've posted is largely meaningless in the specific context of what happened at Boeing. The fact that aviation is overall safer now than 30 years ago does not prove that how the Max was certified was safe.


The fact that 2 aircraft crashed is sufficient evidence. I would have thought that obvious. And how about sufficient independant oversight to ensure such an astonishingly bad idea as MCAS, as it was implemented, never made it past the drawing board.

I'm afraid you are wrong, simply due to the fact that the numbers do not support your argument.

You mean cheaper. The fox guarding the chicken coop. What could possibly go wrong.....

Self-certification is actually much more expensive due to the fact that the Airworthiness Representatives can charge so much money due to the difficulty of obtaining their qualifications and technical expertise. Versus the European system where there's not enough experts to oversee everything.

Mistakes happen?!! Good grief! Mistakes like this should never happen. This was not a subtle flaw which somehow made through a robust certification process, it was mindbendingly bad idea - the result of cost cutting and a far too cosy relationship with the regulator.

Welcome to the real world, where nothing is perfect.

Cost cutting does not come into it. In fact the FAA is the only regulator in the world who still spends a substantial amount of money into research. They are also the main source of regulations. Have a look at Code of Federal Regulations Part 25, versus Certification Specification 25 and spot any differences.

All EASA (and all other regulators around the world) did was largely copy paste what the FAA already had.

I await on a recommendation of a process you have evidence works better than what currently is out there.

Again, just to reiterate that of course something went wrong in this case and should be investigated and actions be taken to ensure this doesn't happen again, but people seem to think that "self-certification" means there's no oversight, this is simply not true, and is unfair to blame the FAA for this.

 

[esmozz]

I'm afraid you are wrong, simply due to the fact that the numbers do not support your argument.

I'm curious then, what numbers would support my argument? 10 crashes? 20? Frankly, I'm not wrong - whereas one accident does not necessarily prove a systemic flaw, in this case it does. To put it in simple terms, Boeing and the FAA certified an aircraft as airworthy. It was not.

Welcome to the real world, where nothing is perfect.

Cost cutting does not come into it.

I live in the real world, thanks. I'm not entirely sure you do with the second line of the above quote. And cost cutting has everything to do with it. From rehashing a 60 year old airframe and slapping MCAS onto it, to keeping quiet about it in order to avoid additional training costs.

In fact the FAA is the only regulator in the world who still spends a substantial amount of money into research.

So what? They still allowed an unairworthy aircraft to be certified as airworthy. You seem to think this was a simple mistake, it was not - it is a fundamental flaw in the relationship between Boeing and the FAA.

They are also the main source of regulations. Have a look at Code of Federal Regulations Part 25, versus Certification Specification 25 and spot any differences.

All EASA (and all other regulators around the world) did was largely copy paste what the FAA already had.

Again, so what? The FAA may well have produced a robust set of certification standards. Standards are useless unless properly enforced.

I await on a recommendation of a process you have evidence works better than what currently is out there.

How about sufficient external oversight to the certification process. MCAS wasnt a subtle flaw which slipped through a robust process - it was mindblowingly stupid. It should have been obvious to anybody who looked at the system.

...and is unfair to blame the FAA for this.

I had to laugh at this. Again, the FAA allowed an unairworthy aircraft to be certified as airworthy, but we shouldnt blame them, right? I'm not entirely sure what you think the job of the FAA is?

 

[M1k3H]

I'm curious then, what numbers would support my argument? 10 crashes? 20? Frankly, I'm not wrong - whereas one accident does not necessarily prove a systemic flaw, in this case it does. To put it in simple terms, Boeing and the FAA certified an aircraft as airworthy. It was not.

I live in the real world, thanks. I'm not entirely sure you do with the second line of the above quote. And cost cutting has everything to do with it. From rehashing a 60 year old airframe and slapping MCAS onto it, to keeping quiet about it in order to avoid additional training costs.


So what? They still allowed an unairworthy aircraft to be certified as airworthy. You seem to think this was a simple mistake, it was not - it is a fundamental flaw in the relationship between Boeing and the FAA.

Again, so what? The FAA may well have produced a robust set of certification standards. Standards are useless unless properly enforced.

How about sufficient external oversight to the certification process. MCAS wasnt a subtle flaw which slipped through a robust process - it was mindblowingly stupid. It should have been obvious to anybody who looked at the system.

I had to laugh at this. Again, the FAA allowed an unairworthy aircraft to be certified as airworthy, but we shouldnt blame them, right? I'm not entirely sure what you think the job of the FAA is?

The thing is the current system has seen a large increase in safety so it works.

I never said it was a simple mistake, in fact I pointed out how the system works, and that it needs a lot of mistakes in a row in order for something this important to be missed. Which is why the system itself is fine overall.

'Sufficient external oversight' sounds nice but in practice does not work. EASA works like that, where they have to approve everything before you lift a finger. In reality they take 6-12 months to properly respond to any technical enquiry due to under staffing and their insistence to check everything. All manufacturers subject to EASA's regulatory oversight were in danger of being left behind due to the huge timescales added.

Also, you have ignored my previous post where I explained how oversight in the self certification system works. Things that are already proven do not need to necessarily go through the FAA, although you do submit everything as you test so they could check anything they wish. Things that are novel and new they go through extreme scrutiny and is something I've seen happen in my previous job a few times.

You also have to undergo multiple audits a year, be AS9100 approved and be accredited to other countless standards depending on the work you do in-house.

The whole point of oversight and regulatory standards is to provide people with a reasonable level of safety, reasonable being a very key word. There are ways to provide almost absolute safety in everything, however these are not pragmatic and would kill any industry that attempted it.

 

[esmozz]

In my previous post I think i came across as unnecessarily sarcastic - it wasn't my intention, I appreciate you do know what your talking about.

However, I think we're unlikely to agree on this.

I agree that aviation is safer today than ever before, however I think this is a case of 3 steps forward 2 steps back.

The simple fact of the matter is that safety costs money, at times a lot of money. I appreciate the problems you describe in EASAland, but solution is to invest more in staff (Easy to say, I know).

I never said it was a simple mistake, in fact I pointed out how the system works, and that it needs a lot of mistakes in a row in order for something this important to be missed. Which is why the system itself is fine overall.

I suspect we're not going to agree here but if the system allows multiple mistakes to slip by then surely there is something wrong with said system. Again, I just want to reiterate just how bad an idea the MCAS implementation was. And that the FAA did, ultimately, certify an unairworthy aircraft.

The fundamental issue here is the culture of cost cutting that exists at Boeing, coupled with the light touch regulation from the FAA, seems to me to lead inevitably to the outcome we have seen. I rather suspect once all the facts are known the FAA will be spending considerably more time and resources overseeing the certification process of new aircraft in the US.

The whole point of oversight and regulatory standards is to provide people with a reasonable level of safety, reasonable being a very key word. There are ways to provide almost absolute safety in everything, however these are not pragmatic and would kill any industry that attempted it.

Again, I agree. If we want absolute safety aircraft would never fly. I'm not suggesting the a government inspector stands over the shoulder of every worker installing every nut and bolt on an aircraft. I appreciate you seems to have an indepth knowledge of the certification process and associated audits, nonetheless it seems to me there is a line where self certification works and where it does not. And that line was crossed here with catastrophic results. And that it was a fundamental flaw in the relationship between the FAA and Boeing (the system) that allowed it to happen.

 

[Em3bbs]

Clearly not? Where do you base this? On 2 accidents?

the number of accidents has been in decline since records began, and that is with increasing numbers of flights.

So it clearly works. Unless you have evidence to the contrary.

Oh no, actual data. This will blow the minds of a few here, including the thread starter. Surely 'fake news'?

 

[M1k3H]

In my previous post I think i came across as unnecessarily sarcastic - it wasn't my intention, I appreciate you do know what your talking about.

However, I think we're unlikely to agree on this.

I agree that aviation is safer today than ever before, however I think this is a case of 3 steps forward 2 steps back.

I was also perhaps a bit too let's say passionate in my arguments, so apologies for that. I guess I am a bit frustrated at people who hear the term self-certification and immediately think that the people designing something also approve their work.

The simple fact of the matter is that safety costs money, at times a lot of money. I appreciate the problems you describe in EASAland, but solution is to invest more in staff (Easy to say, I know).

Yes, trouble is they have a limited budget constraining their intake. It is also a very small industry so pretty difficult to actually find any staff that would want to do that job for not a lot of money (public sector).

I suspect we're not going to agree here but if the system allows multiple mistakes to slip by then surely there is something wrong with said system. Again, I just want to reiterate just how bad an idea the MCAS implementation was. And that the FAA did, ultimately, certify an unairworthy aircraft.

The fundamental issue here is the culture of cost cutting that exists at Boeing, coupled with the light touch regulation from the FAA, seems to me to lead inevitably to the outcome we have seen. I rather suspect once all the facts are known the FAA will be spending considerably more time and resources overseeing the certification process of new aircraft in the US.

Again, I agree. If we want absolute safety aircraft would never fly. I'm not suggesting the a government inspector stands over the shoulder of every worker installing every nut and bolt on an aircraft. I appreciate you seems to have an indepth knowledge of the certification process and associated audits, nonetheless it seems to me there is a line where self certification works and where it does not. And that line was crossed here with catastrophic results. And that it was a fundamental flaw in the relationship between the FAA and Boeing (the system) that allowed it to happen.

When it comes to production and engineering, what you've said is almost exactly what happens. Everything comes in with certificates of conformity so you know exactly what goes where, and you have inspectors stamping every single part going out the doors, ensuring it conforms to drawing. In the beginning of a shipment, Boeing would even send their own inspectors to ensure the quality was up to scratch, before fully delegating to our own inspectors. I've rejected items multiple times knowing that it would cost my company thousands of £, simply because I wasn't happy signing something off that could affect a human life at some point in future. So there has to be a level of appreciation in what you are signing off and the impact it could have in future. Without this culture, it doesn't matter how many inspectors are over people's shoulders, something unsafe will go past. Example is a Japanese seating company Koito. They were doing the dynamic sled test which has to happen at 16g, and you basically rely on the test lab to give you accelerometer data to ensure the pulse conforms to the standard (cfr25.562 if of interest). Turns out the printout was falsified, so even though somebody saw a pulse which conformed to the regulation, it wasn't the actual pulse applied to their seats, hence the seats were tested to a lower acceleration.

Boeing is generally, in my experience, very strict when it comes to showing compliance, but I can appreciate that there might be certain personnel who lack the appreciation of the importance of their work. I am also aware that they shed some of their staff, so that might have put more stress on existing personnel, which could have resulted is things being missed or rushed through.

The self-certification system is meant to be two-pronged.

The first aspect is what I've already explained in my earlier posts, which basically means the 'independent' individuals (Airworthiness Representatives) have the technical liability (not sure if they are also legally responsible, I believe they are, but not sure).

The second aspect, which is perhaps more important to Boeing and other manufacturers (especially in the US) is that of the compensation in result of an accident. This is what companies fear most (losing £££) and why this system overwhelmingly works well. There's also the money loss in project delays due to Boeing now being classed as a 'high risk' manufacturer, which would draw more scrutiny from the FAA.

I think what needs to happen is to increase the frequency of 'mini-audits' by the FAA, essentially diving into live projects and retaining final approval, done at random so that everybody is on their toes. Of course, with Trump in the White House, that won't happen, as he is a firm supported of aviation deregulation. (Link: https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisa...rs-further-weaken-faa-oversight/#5aff5b443ca7 I haven't read this article in full, but have read what it explain in the second half in other publications when that was in the news)

 

[stockhausen]

No message.

 

[M1k3H]

Well that IS a relief.

I was under the impression that Boeing had failed to notice a major flaw on their latest aircraft . . . oh no, make that two unintentional cost-saving "oversights".

Where is Ralph Nader when you need him?

It is a relief for me also, so glad to hear we have something in common, especially when it comes to safety.

So, how does that relate to the overall numbers? How do those 2 accidents 'skew' the safety numbers?

It doesn't. Aviation is still safer than ever, hence the direction the FAA, EASA, Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier, etc. are taking is working.

 

[StriderX]

This is literally what happens every time you let business self-regulate. Boeing should be done for murder.

Currently a class action from the victims families, the shareholders and pilots are under way, this is better hurt them enough. (I assume airlines are getting sweetener deals instead to persuade them away from their own suits)

 

[Minstadave]

Well the plane will probably be the safest one flying at the end of this process as it will have been under intense scrutiny. I wouldn't worry about flying on it personally.

It's extremely unfortunate it took hundreds of dead people to get to that point however.