Feb 9 (commentary)--Kodak's disclosure today that they were getting out of the camera and digital frame business seems like a shock, but it isn't. Most of us had predicted that for some time now. I believe I first wrote that the end was inevitable for Kodak cameras when they bought Chinon a number of years ago. I'm a little surprised it took this long to close the door.
I believe Kodak's management is more clueless today than it was at the end of the film era when it needed to transition to digital. Paper printing and print kiosks are where they're putting the last stake in the ground. I'm not even sure they'll get that stake fully secured before the steam roller hits it.
The future of displaying images isn't on paper. The print kiosk business is slowly dying, so being a big player there is just another dinosaur business and delays the inevitable. Two technologies are pushing forward for display of images: LCDs (dynamic) and E-Ink (static). Kodak has almost no skin in either game. The skin they did have--digital frames (LCDs in frames)--wasn't very much to start with, but now it's gone.
The future for images is clearly cloud-stored, wireless displayed on whatever device screen you desire. It is not "print it on paper."
Note that I'm not saying that paper will go away any time soon. Just as the US Postal Service hasn't gone away because of email, paper will stick around for quite some time. The problem is the same one as the USPS has, though: the primary driver of volume and profit (letters for mail, prints for photos) is moving to a new medium (email for mail, displays for photos). These kinds of transitions tend to leave a smaller, less profitable, and non-growing market behind. But that's exactly where Kodak just placed its bets: on smaller, less profitable, and slow-or-no-growth markets. Meanwhile, they couldn't wean themselves off the high profit margins in film, even as that market dramatically shrinks, so they kept that bit of the company.
Kodak is now on Death Watch, AFAIC. To win in printers, they have to beat HP, Lexmark, Epson, Brother, and Canon, who will all definitely fight hard to protect their territory. Worldwide, those companies were about 85% of the printer market in 2010, and year-to-year growth is modest (maybe 15%). This is no different than the challenge in cameras: there you have to beat Nikon, Canon, Panasonic, Sony, Samsung, Olympus, and others that hold more than 80% of the market, and the year-to-year growth is non-existent. I don't see a lot of difference in the market Kodak chose to exit versus the one it choose to stay in.
Kodak's strategy seems to be "we were too late with the right things for the game in market 1, let's see if that's true in market 2" (it is) and "Keep the things that still have higher profit margins and hold on as long as we can" (which probably won't be long).
Kodak's best business still in the fold is the higher-end commercial printing business, but it's not a big enough business for anything like the old Kodak to survive. Indeed, last year Kodak was projecting something near US$6b in business in 2011 (they're not going to make it). Their projection for the core businesses they now plan to keep was US$2b in 2013 (not clear they'll make that). In the 9-month year-to-year results for 2010 and 2011, we find that they've slipped 18% in sales but increased 2% in cost of sales. That's before we get to all the corporate stuff like admin, R&D, restructuring, etc.
The best case I see is a Kodak that's less than one-third its size at the start of last year, that's not overly profitable, has only modest growth, and will have to use patent sale revenue to pay back the debtor-in-bankruptcy and restructuring charges.
Short story: Kodak never solved its management decisionmaking problems. It's still making them.