Well Sony got rekt with that and we have much more intricate viruses about, they surely wouldn't try it again.
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New law!! for music cd/dvd owned, you're no longer allowed to copy songs for private use
- Thread starter Old Man
- Start date
Well Sony got rekt with that and we have much more intricate viruses about, they surely wouldn't try it again.
So much fail in this thread and on so many levels.
First, background to the law in question. The Copyright Design & Patents Act 1988 governs the application of copyright in the UK. The act provides, in short, that (i) copyright owners have enforceable rights to protect their intellectual property in a civil capacity, and (ii) a few criminal offences mostly relating to profiteering from distribution of unlawful copies of works.
"Ripping CDs" has, until recently, been lawfully dubious. Prohibited copying for musical work includes reproducing (without licence) work in any material form, including storing the work in any medium by electronic means (s.17(2)). On any sensible construction, that would include the ripping of CDs. However, please note this is not a criminal offence and is only actionable in a civil manner (unless the aforementioned 'profiteering' thresholds are met).
For years, the government, its advisers and the Intellectual Property Office have recognised the law was not really appropriate in the context of making personal copies. Ripping CDs, for example, is widely considered acceptable and it is difficult, at face value, to see how it causes any harm.
As such, the government introduced legislation last year to expressly make ripping CDs lawful. This is set out in new s.28B, the body of text of the same being as follows:
[28B Personal copies for private use]
[(1) The making of a copy of a work, other than a computer program, by an individual does not infringe copyright in the work provided that the copy—
(a) is a copy of—
(i) the individual's own copy of the work, or
(ii) a personal copy of the work made by the individual,
(b) is made for the individual's private use, and
(c) is made for ends which are neither directly nor indirectly commercial.
(2) In this section “the individual's own copy” is a copy which—
(a) has been lawfully acquired by the individual on a permanent basis,
(b) is not an infringing copy, and
(c) has not been made under any provision of this Chapter which permits the making of a copy without infringing copyright.
(3) In this section a “personal copy” means a copy made under this section.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), a copy “lawfully acquired on a permanent basis”—
(a) includes a copy which has been purchased, obtained by way of a gift, or acquired by means of a download resulting from a purchase or a gift (other than a download of a kind mentioned in paragraph (b)); and
(b) does not include a copy which has been borrowed, rented, broadcast or streamed, or a copy which has been obtained by means of a download enabling no more than temporary access to the copy.
(5) In subsection (1)(b) “private use” includes private use facilitated by the making of a copy—
(a) as a back up copy,
(b) for the purposes of format-shifting, or
(c) for the purposes of storage, including in an electronic storage area accessed by means of the internet or similar means which is accessible only by the individual (and the person responsible for the storage area).
(6) Copyright in a work is infringed if an individual transfers a personal copy of the work to another person (otherwise than on a private and temporary basis), except where the transfer is authorised by the copyright owner.
(7) If copyright is infringed as set out in subsection (6), a personal copy which has been transferred is for all purposes subsequently treated as an infringing copy.
(8) Copyright in a work is also infringed if an individual, having made a personal copy of the work, transfers the individual's own copy of the work to another person (otherwise than on a private and temporary basis) and, after that transfer and without the licence of the copyright owner, retains any personal copy.
(9) If copyright is infringed as set out in subsection (8), any retained personal copy is for all purposes subsequently treated as an infringing copy.
(10) To the extent that a term of a contract purports to prevent or restrict the making of a copy which, by virtue of this section, would not infringe copyright, that term is unenforceable.
[(1) The making of a copy of a work, other than a computer program, by an individual does not infringe copyright in the work provided that the copy—
(a) is a copy of—
(i) the individual's own copy of the work, or
(ii) a personal copy of the work made by the individual,
(b) is made for the individual's private use, and
(c) is made for ends which are neither directly nor indirectly commercial.
(2) In this section “the individual's own copy” is a copy which—
(a) has been lawfully acquired by the individual on a permanent basis,
(b) is not an infringing copy, and
(c) has not been made under any provision of this Chapter which permits the making of a copy without infringing copyright.
(3) In this section a “personal copy” means a copy made under this section.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), a copy “lawfully acquired on a permanent basis”—
(a) includes a copy which has been purchased, obtained by way of a gift, or acquired by means of a download resulting from a purchase or a gift (other than a download of a kind mentioned in paragraph (b)); and
(b) does not include a copy which has been borrowed, rented, broadcast or streamed, or a copy which has been obtained by means of a download enabling no more than temporary access to the copy.
(5) In subsection (1)(b) “private use” includes private use facilitated by the making of a copy—
(a) as a back up copy,
(b) for the purposes of format-shifting, or
(c) for the purposes of storage, including in an electronic storage area accessed by means of the internet or similar means which is accessible only by the individual (and the person responsible for the storage area).
(6) Copyright in a work is infringed if an individual transfers a personal copy of the work to another person (otherwise than on a private and temporary basis), except where the transfer is authorised by the copyright owner.
(7) If copyright is infringed as set out in subsection (6), a personal copy which has been transferred is for all purposes subsequently treated as an infringing copy.
(8) Copyright in a work is also infringed if an individual, having made a personal copy of the work, transfers the individual's own copy of the work to another person (otherwise than on a private and temporary basis) and, after that transfer and without the licence of the copyright owner, retains any personal copy.
(9) If copyright is infringed as set out in subsection (8), any retained personal copy is for all purposes subsequently treated as an infringing copy.
(10) To the extent that a term of a contract purports to prevent or restrict the making of a copy which, by virtue of this section, would not infringe copyright, that term is unenforceable.
The six issues that are between the parties are as follows:-
• Issue I: The relevant legal principles: The margin of appreciation and the intensity of review; the direct effect of Article 5(2)(b); the law relating to consultations and the appraisal of evidence.
• Issue II: The meaning of "harm": This is relevant to the identification of that for which compensation is due under Article 5(2)(b). The Claimants submit that the Secretary of State misunderstood the concept and accordingly misapplied Article 5(2)(b).
• Issue III: The alleged irrationality and/or inapplicability of the pricing-in principle: The Claimants submit that the pricing-in economic principle is irrational, illogical and inapplicable. Pricing-in cannot properly exist in the absence of an ability to price discriminate which ability does not exist in the affected music , publishing and film sectors.
• Issue IV: The submission that the decision was flawed because the evidence relied upon to justify the conclusion about harm was inadequate/manifestly inadequate: This submission focuses upon the Secretary of State's conclusion that the exception would lead to minimal or zero harm when the evidence relied upon does not support that conclusion.
• Issue V: Whether the Secretary of State predetermined the outcome of the consultation: The Claimants contend that the Secretary of State was so firmly committed to introducing an exception without a compensation scheme that his "pre-disposition" in truth was a "predetermination" which, in law, was unlawful.
• Issue VI: Does the introduction of Section 28B constitute unlawful State aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU which was not notified to the Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU and so is unlawful: The impact assessments record that the new exception will confer a benefit worth about £258 million over ten years on technology providers. It is submitted that this amounts to unnotified illegal aid granted "through State resources" contrary to Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.
Conclusions
19. In relation to the substantive issues (i.e. II-VI) I have decided Issues II, III, V, and VI in favour of the Secretary of State.
20. However, I have decided Issue IV in favour of the Claimants: see section I below at paragraphs [232] – [273]. This is because the conclusions and inferences which have been drawn from the evidence the Secretary of State has relied upon are simply not warranted or justified by that evidence. This is a conclusion I would arrive at on the basis of any test for judicial review; it is not as such dependent upon the review being intensive or merits based.
(iv) Consequences
21. Issue IV is material to the legality of the decision of the Secretary of State to adopt section 28B. In my judgment it is sufficient therefore to result in the decision being rendered unlawful. However, this has potentially complex implications for section 28B. It does not necessarily result in that section being struck down. It is, in theory, possible for the Secretary of State to re-investigate the issue in order to address the evidential gap which now prevails. If he does this then one possible outcome would be that the gap that I have identified is plugged and the present decision becomes justified. Another outcome might be that following further investigation the gap in the evidence remains un-plugged in which case the Secretary of State could either repeal section 28B or introduce a compensation scheme. A third possibility is that the Secretary of State simply decides to introduce a compensation scheme without more.
22. A second issue arising is that although I have come to conclusions on the central legal issues arising there can be no doubt but that the questions of law are of wide significance both in this jurisdiction and in the EU and elsewhere. I therefore should consider the possibility that questions should be referred to the Court of Justice before making any final orders in this case.
23. The net effect of my conclusions is that in principle the claim for judicial review succeeds and that the next stage is for the parties to make submissions as to next steps.
• Issue I: The relevant legal principles: The margin of appreciation and the intensity of review; the direct effect of Article 5(2)(b); the law relating to consultations and the appraisal of evidence.
• Issue II: The meaning of "harm": This is relevant to the identification of that for which compensation is due under Article 5(2)(b). The Claimants submit that the Secretary of State misunderstood the concept and accordingly misapplied Article 5(2)(b).
• Issue III: The alleged irrationality and/or inapplicability of the pricing-in principle: The Claimants submit that the pricing-in economic principle is irrational, illogical and inapplicable. Pricing-in cannot properly exist in the absence of an ability to price discriminate which ability does not exist in the affected music , publishing and film sectors.
• Issue IV: The submission that the decision was flawed because the evidence relied upon to justify the conclusion about harm was inadequate/manifestly inadequate: This submission focuses upon the Secretary of State's conclusion that the exception would lead to minimal or zero harm when the evidence relied upon does not support that conclusion.
• Issue V: Whether the Secretary of State predetermined the outcome of the consultation: The Claimants contend that the Secretary of State was so firmly committed to introducing an exception without a compensation scheme that his "pre-disposition" in truth was a "predetermination" which, in law, was unlawful.
• Issue VI: Does the introduction of Section 28B constitute unlawful State aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU which was not notified to the Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU and so is unlawful: The impact assessments record that the new exception will confer a benefit worth about £258 million over ten years on technology providers. It is submitted that this amounts to unnotified illegal aid granted "through State resources" contrary to Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.
Conclusions
19. In relation to the substantive issues (i.e. II-VI) I have decided Issues II, III, V, and VI in favour of the Secretary of State.
20. However, I have decided Issue IV in favour of the Claimants: see section I below at paragraphs [232] – [273]. This is because the conclusions and inferences which have been drawn from the evidence the Secretary of State has relied upon are simply not warranted or justified by that evidence. This is a conclusion I would arrive at on the basis of any test for judicial review; it is not as such dependent upon the review being intensive or merits based.
(iv) Consequences
21. Issue IV is material to the legality of the decision of the Secretary of State to adopt section 28B. In my judgment it is sufficient therefore to result in the decision being rendered unlawful. However, this has potentially complex implications for section 28B. It does not necessarily result in that section being struck down. It is, in theory, possible for the Secretary of State to re-investigate the issue in order to address the evidential gap which now prevails. If he does this then one possible outcome would be that the gap that I have identified is plugged and the present decision becomes justified. Another outcome might be that following further investigation the gap in the evidence remains un-plugged in which case the Secretary of State could either repeal section 28B or introduce a compensation scheme. A third possibility is that the Secretary of State simply decides to introduce a compensation scheme without more.
22. A second issue arising is that although I have come to conclusions on the central legal issues arising there can be no doubt but that the questions of law are of wide significance both in this jurisdiction and in the EU and elsewhere. I therefore should consider the possibility that questions should be referred to the Court of Justice before making any final orders in this case.
23. The net effect of my conclusions is that in principle the claim for judicial review succeeds and that the next stage is for the parties to make submissions as to next steps.
- Historic legislation was quite clear that ripping CDs was infringement of copyright in a civil capacity.
- The government has legislated to change that position (e.g. to allow individuals to rip CDs for personal use).
- This was challenged by a group of private individuals, which the government challenged.
- The group of private individuals won on one out of numerous grounds.
- The matter is being referred to a higher court to discuss a sensible outcome - the legislation will not necessarily be struck out.
Lessons:
- Don't believe what you read on the internet.
- Read?
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Caporegime
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- Welling, London
With all the laws on torrents, ripping music and more, I'd wager there is not a single forum member who has never broken the law.
But who gives a toss? Certainly not me.
But who gives a toss? Certainly not me.
Pretty much, essentially the bodies that have challenged the act are saying that they expect people who have already paid for the music on CD, to have to pay for it on iTunes or whatever as well to actually get it onto another digital device. Lovely bit of double dipping.
Fair enough to Xordium, they are trying to protect their member's incomes, but there's a point where any reasonable person is going to say, hang on, I'm having to pay twice or even more for this to remain legal?
Or pay a subscription for music you'll never own. Hell I use Spotify, but I'm not paying for it.
The law was changed last year, the Musicians Union or whatever it's called has taken the government to court to challenge the law to try and revert it back to making it illegal again.
Caporegime
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I may be being dense, but I can't see what possible argument there is against this law for the general public. I can see why it's so with things like karaoke discs for KJ's as they're considered tools of the trade, but not with the general public. Makes no sense at all. Is it literally just down to greed?
Seems we could end up with one rule for the music industry and another then for any other form of digital content. Software for instance can relate to paying for the license rather than the media so you can store that on whatever media you like as long as you have a valid license when it comes to use the content. With software on CD / DVD I'm sure some companies actively encourage the user to make a backup copy, for themselves of course. Since software companies have to employ a form of license key to deal with the piracy issue the same should be the case for the music industry. It's the music industry's problem to come up with a solution, not impose a tax on blank media as a lazy, hammer to crack a nut solution.
It seems like a waste of everyone's time considering the legality of something, which almost everyone is then going to ignore.
Doing 71 in a 70, illegal but meh, so what.
Every time I look at backing stuff up, I still come back to that it is easier just to buy another hard drive and copy it onto that.
Doing 71 in a 70, illegal but meh, so what.
Every time I look at backing stuff up, I still come back to that it is easier just to buy another hard drive and copy it onto that.
I know it's a bit extreme, but I've been boycotting the entire music industry for ages 
If I want to listen to something, either pop the radio on, or find it on YouTube.
I don't pirate, and don't buy it either. There's hardly anything worth listening to anyhow
The music industry is too powerful, churns out far too much ****, and constantly fights against new technology and business models. They can all go fizzle, along with all the ***** "artists" they push. I've heard better music on the C64 then most of the trash released these days.
No swearing disguised or otherwise. Thank you.
If I want to listen to something, either pop the radio on, or find it on YouTube.I don't pirate, and don't buy it either. There's hardly anything worth listening to anyhow
The music industry is too powerful, churns out far too much ****, and constantly fights against new technology and business models. They can all go fizzle, along with all the ***** "artists" they push. I've heard better music on the C64 then most of the trash released these days.
No swearing disguised or otherwise. Thank you.
Soldato
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Last CD I bought was in 2001 - Papa Roach: Infest.
I use Spotify now anyway.
I use Spotify now anyway.
Soldato
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- Nottingham
So the music which I buy on CD, and cannot get from iTunes et al (at least from the UK store) I'm not allowed to rip to iTunes ... **** that.
I'm supporting the artist buying their CD release as far as I am concerned. And I've probably bought 50+ so far this year alone.
I'm supporting the artist buying their CD release as far as I am concerned. And I've probably bought 50+ so far this year alone.
Finding it on YouTube for the most part is no different to just downloading it.I know it's a bit extreme, but I've been boycotting the entire music industry for ages
I don't pirate, and don't buy it either. There's hardly anything worth listening to anyhow
The music industry is too powerful, churns out far too much ****, and constantly fights against new technology and business models. They can all go fizzle, along with all the ***** "artists" they push. I've heard better music on the C64 then most of the trash released these days.