Air India Crash

FO was PF, he would have had both hands on the yoke and the captain would have had his hand over the thrust lever until v1 to abort the take off if he deemed necessary. It seems pretty obvious to me it was the captain who did it if it wasn't some bizarre failure of both switches at the same time.
 
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I'm trying to understand why it was done. Is that explained anywhere? I haven't read the thread for a few days.

There's only a preliminary report so far and all that identifies is that it happened (but not exactly how), one asked the other why they did it and the response was that they didn't do it.

As far as I can see, much beyond that is just additional speculation from various parties.

You can read the report yourself - https://aaib.gov.in/What's New Assets/Preliminary Report VT-ANB.pdf
 
I'm trying to understand why it was done. Is that explained anywhere? I haven't read the thread for a few days.

The switches were moved, more than likely as an act by one of the pilots. The chances of it being caused by something else are small, but not zero.

If it IS pilot action, accidental or deliberate is not yet known.
 
Absolutely, but the particular example you quote is also due to a punitive culture whereby pilots were terrified of doing anything non standard due to fear of be punished for even minor deviations from procedures.

Safety in aviation is as much about culture (company or otherwise) as it is about technology.

It’s also due to pilots assuming the computer is right. Like the idiots who follow GPS off a cliff etc. people assume computer is right.

I highly recommend a book called The Tombstone Imperative, it’s a bit old now but an excellent read.
 
It's not as if the WSJ has expertise in analysing air accidents when all they did was read the preliminary report that we've all read.
 
Just another site wanting clicks. The preliminary report doesn't tell us who said what. Yes the PF normally would have hands occupied elsewhere but normally planes don't sink down and crash from 200ft either do they so assuming anything at this stage is not helpful.
 
I'm trying to understand why it was done. Is that explained anywhere? I haven't read the thread for a few days.
The fuel cutoff switches were moved from RUN to CUTOFF, 3 seconds after liftoff.

Pretty much the only possible explanation is a deliberate action by one of the pilots (probably murder/suicide, but an infinitesimally small chance it was the biggest brain fart of the century).
 
The fuel cutoff switches were moved from RUN to CUTOFF, 3 seconds after liftoff.

Pretty much the only possible explanation is a deliberate action by one of the pilots (probably murder/suicide, but an infinitesimally small chance it was the biggest brain fart of the century).
also the time you raise the landing gear...what if the pilot did it absent mindedly rather than raise wheels...once you start it's like muscle memory... I've been driving for years, and other day in my new car I turned the engine off (while parked) instead of putting the car in drive (new mini, the switches are next to each other). i do wonder why they have the switches down there...why not put them at the front or above where you physically have to reach away from the yoke/throttle/flaps/landing gear etc. Then it's in a completely different location where there's less chance of error as you'd have to physically move to reach switches...I mean, when do you need them...to start the engines and shut them down...put them front and center, then it's less in the peripheral vision of the other pilotand he's more likely to say 'what are you doing' before they get flipped on/off
 
also the time you raise the landing gear...what if the pilot did it absent mindedly rather than raise wheels...once you start it's like muscle memory...
That's also a possibility, muscle memory can do some very strange things.

I.E, show me somebody who's worked in IT for decades and I'll show you somebody who has most likely at least once gone to Alt-Tab but their hand had pressed Alt-F4.
 
also the time you raise the landing gear...what if the pilot did it absent mindedly rather than raise wheels...once you start it's like muscle memory...
Which is why I said brain fart. I also said it was an infinitesimally small chance of that, because it took 10 whole seconds to get the first switch back to RUN and another 4 to get the second one.

At this stage of takeoff, the pilot monitoring (Captain, in this case) would have their hands off the throttles and controls because you're committed to the air. The fuel cutoffs are also in a different enough position (down below the throttles, roughly abeam your torso) to the landing gear lever (for the Captain, reaching over the top of the throttles, leaning forward and right) that I can't see it being a brain fart.
 
Which is why I said brain fart. I also said it was an infinitesimally small chance of that, because it took 10 whole seconds to get the first switch back to RUN and another 4 to get the second one.

Which would make sense if you think you've just raised the gear.

The report is rather vague and unless the WSJ has some kind of source within the investigation, I imagine they're just speculating.
 
Doesn't explain why it took another 4 seconds for the second one though given they were apparently switched to cut off within a second of each other.
 
Two things worth mentioning - the captain was a training captain, so there’s a good chance he taught in the simulator (a quick google hasn’t confirmed this though) and when conducting simulated emergencies it is common to just reset the program after the event. This also involves flicking switches back to the required positions, including the fuel cutoff if you’re going back to the gate. It could simply be a case of muscle memory where something trigger him to do it without thinking and he didn’t even realise.

Recognising this and reverting it would take a few seconds. Along with that, I have seen a shot on another forum of the engine failure memory item checklist (can’t confirm it was 787) and that requires the engine to be at below idle speed before introducing fuel for restart. They were both at takeoff thrust before suddenly having the fuel cut, and the momentum the fan has at that point would take an age to slow down - the core would be quicker, but still a fair while.

Finally, I don’t think the time between rotate and shutoff is enough to confirm positive rate and call for gear up, ie it wasn’t him mixing up the controls. I’d defer to @esmozz for this and anything else he thinks I might have incorrect here based on his experience.
 
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Doesn't explain why it took another 4 seconds for the second one though given they were apparently switched to cut off within a second of each other.

I would make sense if they where following an electronic checklist i.e. the actions required in the event of dual engine flameout would be displayed on a screen, you would read the item aloud, then perform the action, and confirm you have done so by pressing a button. It would then move to the next action, which you would then perform and confirm with a button press etc etc.
 
Two things worth mentioning - the captain was a training captain, so there’s a good chance he taught in the simulator (a quick google hasn’t confirmed this though) and when conducting simulated emergencies it is common to just reset the program after the event. This also involves flicking switches back to the required positions, including the fuel cutoff if you’re going back to the gate. It could simply be a case of muscle memory where something trigger him to do it without thinking and he didn’t even realise.
That could well be the case but a line training captain would typically only perform training on line flights where practicing emergency procedures is prohibited. Line training is generally only performed on revenue flights (i.e. with passengers) and only covers normal day to day operations.

If he held additional qualifications such as TRI (Type rating instructor) he would spend a fair amount of time in simulators and it could be as you say.

Recognising this and reverting it would take a few seconds. Along with that, I have seen a shot on another forum of the engine failure memory item checklist (can’t confirm it was 787) and that requires the engine to be at below idle speed before introducing fuel for restart. They were both at takeoff thrust before suddenly having the fuel cut, and the momentum the fan has at that point would take an age to slow down - the core would be quicker, but still a fair while.

That sounds like the checklist for an inflight restart after a single engine has shutdown (say due to a flame out where it is suspected there is no actual damage to the engine). It's a different procedure for a dual engine failure (at least on the 737 and a quick google suggests its the same for the 787). As far as I'm aware you don't wait for anything on the 787, simply recycle the fuel cutoff switches. I don't know if memory items are performed through the electronic checklist system on the 787, common sense would suggest not but it may well be this is an option you can specify. (On the 737 you wait for the EGT to decrease before reintroducing fuel into the engine but a quick google suggests this step is not required for the 787)

Finally, I don’t think the time between rotate and shutoff is enough to confirm positive rate and call for gear up, ie it wasn’t him mixing up the controls. I’d defer to @esmozz for this and anything else he thinks I might have incorrect here based on his experience.

It does rather depend on the airline procedures. Some airlines will require a 'positive climb' call the moment any rate of climb is seem on the IVSI. Others may require the call be made only after seeing 500fpm (or similar number). I believe there was 3 seconds between initial rotation and the fuel being shutoff so I suspect you're right but I'd not be 100% certain.
 
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That could well be the case but a line training captain would typically only perform training on line flights where practicing emergency procedures is prohibited. Line training is generally only performed on revenue flights (i.e. with passengers) and only covers normal day to day operations.

If he held additional qualifications such as TRI (Type rating instructor) he would spend a fair amount of time in simulators and it could be as you say.

Sorry, I didn’t mean he was doing any actual training - just that something triggered that part of brain to start ’resetting‘ the cockpit as if he was in the sim.

If it seems like I’m grasping at straws to come up with any scenario that doesn’t involve one of them maliciously turning the engines off, then you’re right - it really is the last thing I want to consider.
 
Sorry, I didn’t mean he was doing any actual training - just that something triggered that part of brain to start ’resetting‘ the cockpit as if he was in the sim.

If it seems like I’m grasping at straws to come up with any scenario that doesn’t involve one of them maliciously turning the engines off, then you’re right - it really is the last thing I want to consider.
No, I understood what you where saying and it makes sense - it could be that.

To be honest it could be pilot suicide and if it is then the industry is going to have to face up to it. I don't like the idea either.

But one of the things that seems really quite odd to me the more I think about it, is just how remarkably vague the preliminary report is. For example - I can see no reason to leave open the question of who said what to who. I have no doubt a full transcript of the cockpit conversation covering the event exists. And things like thrust setting, aircraft configuration seem to be missing.
 
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