My Vista is stable and nippy

It doesn't matter what they use, really.
It clearly does otherwise their software likely would have been Vista compatible and they wouldn't have inconvenienced their customer.

Note that Microsoft won't give any software a "Certified for Windows" badge if it doesn't use a MSI Windows Installer.

I don't see how this is an exploit either. That's a fairly serious claim and if you are indeed sure this is a vulnerability then you might want to write an e-mail to Microsoft. All I see here is that the security layer provided by UAC screwed up the crappy install program for this software.

The software didn't install properly because it's not Vista compatible - big woop.
 
The software "is" vista compatible because it works in Vista. Now the installer isn't "UAC" compatible but is Vista compatible because it works with UAC turned off.... That makes more sense.
 
The software "is" vista compatible because it works in Vista. Now the installer isn't "UAC" compatible but is Vista compatible because it works with UAC turned off.... That makes more sense.

Nope because UAC is on by default on Vista. Therefore if you want to target Vista with your software then you have to make sure it executes correctly on a default install.

Seriously, no one is saying UAC is a god send. It isn't. It has caused plenty of headaches for programmers (I would know). Luckily Microsoft provide excellent support and articles on MSDN which advise programmers on how to make their software compatible with Vista and UAC. See here: http://msdn.microsoft.com/msdnmag/issues/07/01/UAC/
 
Indeed but I was clarifying your statement :p you said *** software is not vista compatible when it is, it's the installer that isn't fully compatible !
 
so i totally understand the reasons of uac and after reading the last 2 pages ive tuned it back on, bit it still pops up some programs which as stated must haver been writen incorrectly to ms requirements.....but ive still not got around my problem on renaming folders and files which works fine when uac turned off when on tells me i need permission.
with sp1 jsut about ot come out is it possible that this might solve and resolve soem problems were all having ??
 
Oh Nathan. I present a story of a piece of software that installs with simple click but can't be uninstalled regardless of your user elevation, and you tell me it's OK because any potential nasties, should they wish to exploit this simple technique, ought to carry "Certified for Windows" label and use MSI installers? That's funny stance. Look at it objectively. "There is no spoon" will not work in this case - uncertified installer or not - leaves software and registry entries alledged Administrator user can not get rid of. And all that BECAUSE of alledged security layer. It doesn't happen with UAC off. It only happens with UAC on, because UAC is not fully prepared for conditions it can't control. And that's what happens when you have Administrators to Administrators. A small paradox of this "the most advanced security model of any mainstream OS out there and far superior to any mainstream variant of Unix" (that goes into my signature at some point if you allow it, btw :)).

I can actually provide anecdote on another funny UAC paradox, with pictures if anyone is interested.
 
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If a program can't install properly with UAC on then it's obviously a problem with the piece of software.

If a program can't uninstall properly then it's a problem with the program.

How hard is that to grasp?

Every program I have used on Windows which has been certified for it installs and uninstalls fine.

How can it be a problem with UAC (or as some people claim with Microsoft) if it's the programs fault?



M.
 
If a program can't install properly with UAC on then it's obviously a problem with the piece of software.
If a program can't uninstall properly then it's a problem with the program.
How hard is that to grasp?

I think you are missing the point. It can install and uninstall properly without UAC. It becomes uninstallable with UAC enabled. Once again - with UAC on Administrator can't quickly uninstall it without a lot of hussle and instead is manouvered into this "it's there but not there" paradox. If it was a trojan or exploit, rather than just random poorly written graphical proggie, UAC would be the main and sole creator of the obstacle facing Administrator trying to get rid of it.
 
I can actually provide anecdote on another funny UAC paradox, with pictures if anyone is interested.

bottom line is though

if stuff wont work with UAC its the software vendors fault, not MS

if they could programme their software properly, it wouldnt be an issue. Its a bit like the kaspersky people kicking up a fuss when it was first announced that Vista would have a closed kernel and nobody would be allowed access

they kicked up a fuss and threatenned anti competition law suits from the EU etc.. because it was preventing their software from working

Sorry, but if Vista was as secure as it should have been, your product shouldnt even need to exist. There's a whole culture of companies that have grown around MS's shortfalls, and every attempt they make to sort it, is smacked back down again.

I genuinely believe that vista would have stopped all the problems with XP, and been tied down tight as a nut

had it not been for all the people that have sponged off it for so long kicking up a fuss about it.
 
I think you are missing the point. It can install and uninstall properly without UAC. It becomes uninstallable with UAC enabled. Once again - with UAC on Administrator can't quickly uninstall it without a lot of hussle and instead is manouvered into this "it's there but not there" paradox. If it was a trojan or exploit, rather than just random poorly written graphical proggie, UAC would be the main and sole creator of the obstacle facing Administrator trying to get rid of it.
I still fail to see what on earth makes you believe this is a vulnerability? If the user wants to uninstall that faulty piece of software then they will have to elevate to Administrator privs. What is the big deal here? It's not Microsoft's fault that IrfanView is broken and hasn't been tested on Vista properly.

Most people would be glad to see that UAC is protecting their Program Files folder from some random program deleting stuff from it.

Oh Nathan. I present a story of a piece of software that installs with simple click but can't be uninstalled regardless of your user elevation, and you tell me it's OK because any potential nasties, should they wish to exploit this simple technique, ought to carry "Certified for Windows" label and use MSI installers? That's funny stance. Look at it objectively. "There is no spoon" will not work in this case - uncertified installer or not - leaves software and registry entries alledged Administrator user can not get rid of. And all that BECAUSE of alledged security layer. It doesn't happen with UAC off. It only happens with UAC on, because UAC is not fully prepared for conditions it can't control. And that's what happens when you have Administrators to Administrators. A small paradox of this "the most advanced security model of any mainstream OS out there and far superior to any mainstream variant of Unix" (that goes into my signature at some point if you allow it, btw :)).

I can actually provide anecdote on another funny UAC paradox, with pictures if anyone is interested.

Heh and that's what this is all about isn't it. Thought you'd have a pop at me indirectly because you disagreed with my perfectly valid statement that Windows has a better security model than Unix.

Try MSN.
 
bottom line is though

if stuff wont work with UAC its the software vendors fault, not MS

if they could programme their software properly, it wouldnt be an issue. Its a bit like the kaspersky people kicking up a fuss when it was first announced that Vista would have a closed kernel and nobody would be allowed access

they kicked up a fuss and threatenned anti competition law suits from the EU etc.. because it was preventing their software from working

Sorry, but if Vista was as secure as it should have been, your product shouldnt even need to exist. There's a whole culture of companies that have grown around MS's shortfalls, and every attempt they make to sort it, is smacked back down again.

I genuinely believe that vista would have stopped all the problems with XP, and been tied down tight as a nut

had it not been for all the people that have sponged off it for so long kicking up a fuss about it.

Thankfully Microsoft has resisted them quite well. None of Vista's security changes were compromised by third party security vendors making complaints, as far as I am aware.

There is a new API for anti-virus and firewall vendors that provides all the operating system hooks they need - without resorting to unstable hacking in the kernel.

Problem is that Microsoft has effectively levelled the playing field with this new API. No longer can security vendors play the "one-up'smanship" game because all of the API is fully documented.
 
I still fail to see what on earth makes you believe this is a vulnerability? If the user wants to uninstall that faulty piece of software then they will have to elevate to Administrator privs. What is the big deal here? It's not Microsoft's fault that IrfanView is broken and hasn't been tested on Vista properly.

Nathan, you are better than this. I'm pointing out that UAC, being security layer in Windows, under certain conditions creates situation where Administrator, which should be the absolute power on any system, can not and will not be able to remove it. Who cares if it's IrfanView's fault. UAC prevents it from being uninstalled. This time it was just a dodgy graphical prog. But it's not like some virii kid will ask for "Virus For Windows" certification. The idiocy of UAC's behavious in this case or next will be still the same.


Heh and that's what this is all about isn't it. Thought you'd have a pop at me indirectly because you disagreed with my perfectly valid statement that Windows has a better security model than Unix.

You've tried it before and you know it won't work. I don't fall for those kind of ambushes - you won't turn it into personal shooting no matter how hard you try. If I'm sending a smiley every now and then with quote of something you said, it's only because you do all those clearly knowledgable Windows comments for threads and threads no end and then every so often you suddently slip oneliner like "Windows NT has probably the most advanced security model far superior to any mainstream variant of Unix". And you do that without Lee Evans like face, or comical pause. So let's look at it as a serious thing to say - on one hand we have windows NT, which (as entertaining and great system as it is for all of us) after years and years of mockery arrived at the point of Administrators not being full Administrators and Owners not having full rights to what they own. On the other we have Unix that had no need or reason to do any major revisions to its implementation of user level and security elevation since what - 1969? With all due respect to your MSDN knowledge, it has to be asked - have you ever even worked with unix systems?



Try MSN for what?
 
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Nathan, you are better than this. I'm pointing out that UAC, being security layer in Windows, under certain conditions creates situation where Administrator, which should be the absolute power on any system, can not and will not be able to remove it. Who cares if it's IrfanView's fault. UAC prevents it from being uninstalled. This time it was just a dodgy graphical prog. But it's not like some virii kid will ask for "Virus For Windows" certification. The idiocy of UAC's behavious in this case or next will be still the same.

You could not infect a system via the vector you are describing, the behaviour of UAC prevents it. It does not allow the code to where it would need to go, and as such any attempt to exploit this 'bug' would be pointless.
 
bottom line is though

if stuff wont work with UAC its the software vendors fault, not MS

if they could programme their software properly, it wouldnt be an issue. Its a bit like the kaspersky people kicking up a fuss when it was first announced that Vista would have a closed kernel and nobody would be allowed access

they kicked up a fuss and threatenned anti competition law suits from the EU etc.. because it was preventing their software from working

Sorry, but if Vista was as secure as it should have been, your product shouldnt even need to exist. There's a whole culture of companies that have grown around MS's shortfalls, and every attempt they make to sort it, is smacked back down again.

I genuinely believe that vista would have stopped all the problems with XP, and been tied down tight as a nut

had it not been for all the people that have sponged off it for so long kicking up a fuss about it.

I agree with that whole heartedly.
 
You could not infect a system via the vector you are describing, the behaviour of UAC prevents it. It does not allow the code to where it would need to go, and as such any attempt to exploit this 'bug' would be pointless.

Dolph, I understand that under current conditions you might see no real use for it, but any instance of Admin not being able uninstall software is bound to be useful for someone at some point. Always.

Going back to original topic of the conversation - I basically disagreed with notion that silent UAC is better than no UAC. UAC's flaw lies in overcomplexity of very simple task - rather than user specifically asking to be elevated to Super User in order to perform a task (like it sudo or Authorization Services in mac), and as such invoking it in full knowledge of the task at hand, UAC asks Admin user for elevated permission over other admins, permission or even most bizarre stuff like changing desktop settings. To make it work properly, to take advantage of it you have to make a decision - you either read the popups, understand what's expected of you and elevate your level with knowledge of what you are doing or you disable UAC and become admin to rule them all and skip virtualization aspect. In my experience leaving UAC to blindly click "yes" to everything behind your back can only lead to problems like the one I described. It's not a solution. It will say "yes" to all things and still won't be able to everything an Admin should.
That's all I'm saying, either leave it on and read or switch it off at your own peril.
 
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Nathan, you are better than this. I'm pointing out that UAC, being security layer in Windows, under certain conditions creates situation where Administrator, which should be the absolute power on any system, can not and will not be able to remove it. Who cares if it's IrfanView's fault. UAC prevents it from being uninstalled. This time it was just a dodgy graphical prog. But it's not like some virii kid will ask for "Virus For Windows" certification. The idiocy of UAC's behavious in this case or next will be still the same.
It's doing it's job. That is what it is designed to do. Protect your critical system and program files folders. UAC is actually quite reasonable if the install program is a MSI Windows Installer. But because this particular application has some dodgy installer UAC thinks "Nah... not in a million years am I going to grant that thing any slack!"

It's perfectly fine. UAC will morph and evolve over the years as demands change. That isn't user demands. It's programmer demands. Sooner or later programmers will get used to writing good applications that are compatible with Vista and Server 2008. So UAC's "compatibility" side can be dialled down, probably by Windows 7.



You've tried it before and you know it won't work. I don't fall for those kind of ambushes - you won't turn it into personal shooting no matter how hard you try. If I'm sending a smiley every now and then with quote of something you said, it's only because you do all those clearly knowledgable Windows comments for threads and threads no end and then every so often you suddently slip oneliner like "Windows NT has probably the most advanced security model far superior to any mainstream variant of Unix". And you do that without Lee Evans like face, or comical pause. So let's look at it as a serious thing to say - on one hand we have windows NT, which (as entertaining and great system as it is for all of us) after years and years of mockery arrived at the point of Administrators not being full Administrators and Owners not having full rights to what they own. On the other we have Unix that had no need or reason to do any major revisions to its implementation of user level and security elevation since what - 1969? With all due respect to your MSDN knowledge, it has to be asked - have you ever even worked with unix systems?
I think it's plain to see for everyone here who is taking a pop at who :) As a moderator of this forum I aren't allowed to get drawn into these types of water pistol contests. But nor do I particularly want to because the last time I gave you some hard core facts on similar subjects you personally attacked me in a last gasp style post :/

Yes I have worked with Unix systems (who hasn't at some stage in their life?)

Try MSN for what?
... That if you want to speak to me about the Unix vs Windows security model subject then you will have to use MSN.
 
Dolph, I understand that under current conditions you might see no real use for it, but any instance of Admin not being able uninstall software is bound to be useful for someone at some point. Always.

Going back to original topic of the conversation - I basically disagreed with notion that silent UAC is better than no UAC. UAC's flaw lies in overcomplexity of very simple task - rather than user specifically asking to be elevated to Super User in order to perform a task (like it sudo or Authorization Services in mac), and as such invoking it in full knowledge of the task at hand, UAC asks Admin user for elevated permission over other admins, permission or even most bizarre stuff like changing desktop settings. To make it work properly, to take advantage of it you have to make a decision - you either read the popups, understand what's expected of you and elevate your level with knowledge of what you are doing or you disable UAC and become admin to rule them all and skip virtualization aspect. In my experience leaving UAC to blindly click "yes" to everything behind your back can only lead to problems like the one I described. It's not a solution. It will say "yes" to all things and still won't be able to everything an Admin should.
That's all I'm saying, either leave it on and read or switch it off at your own peril.

Try using the "compatibility" options of UAC next time you have a legacy program that doesn't want to install.

vistauaccompatlb6.gif
 
It's doing it's job. That is what it is designed to do. Protect your critical system and program files folders.

Nathan please, how is preventing admin from uninstalling software part of secure design? This is crucial design failure - either let's have a sandbox installation system, or let's not treat unistall files, the only clean way out, as critical system files. All the neccessary mechanisms are built into windows, you have restore points and (bad, but still) permission elevation, all it needs to do is run test stage - will this prog install, if no, then let's display "this program will not install with UAC in silent mode, try running it as administrator" rather than allow it to write to registry and then fail miserably inserting mechanism responsible for uninstalling it.

UAC is actually quite reasonable if the install program is a MSI Windows Installer. But because this particular application has some dodgy installer UAC thinks "Nah... not in a million years am I going to grant that thing any slack!"

If it didn't grant it any slack it wouldnt' be an issue. But what it does is allow it to install and then cut off possibility for Administrator, out of all users, to have any control over it. It's not that it prevents something from being installed, it's a problem with which element of the software it decides to refuse. What it does is a lot like letting bank robbers to enter the building, take all the money, kill all the hostages and then walk away, while police is surrounded tightly with wall of bulletproof glass "for their own protection" and bullets removed, just so they don't hurt themselves while shooting bad guys.

At the end of the day it's a very simple dilema - is UAC supposed to protect your system or is it supposed to pretend to protect it, only if software follows certain rules and etiquette. If it's supposed to protect your system then it should remove all bits of the software in question after unsuccessful installation. Not just block ways to uninstall it.

I think it's plain to see for everyone here who is taking a pop at who :) As a moderator of this forum I aren't allowed to get drawn into these types of water pistol contests. But nor do I particularly want to because the last time I gave you some hard core facts on similar subjects you personally attacked me in a last gasp style post :/

And I hope "no water pistol contest" policy will remain active. My turn of phrase might not always be the most fortunate or gramatically correct (it's quite obvious English is not my first language) and so if you felt attacked at any point in any of our conversations, I apologize, it wasn't my intention and I would like you to keep in mind, now and always- just because I don't agree with you on some aspect of technology it doesn't mean I'm attacking you personally.

Yes I have worked with Unix systems (who hasn't at some stage in their life?)

Then you know user elevation in unix just works. There is no special magic or complication to it. The person invoking administrative command either does so as root or doesn't have opportunity to perform it. There is no "do it as half admin, sandbox will say yes in a background and half of it will be done while the other half fails" aspect to it and never will be.
UAC, I can only presume was meant to be the simple, clean sudo equivalent for windows permission system, but instead it just does this bizarre excercise of striping Admin of his level for most tasks rather than introducing clean distinction between what admin should do and what should remain in hands of regular user.

But let me give you another example why UAC in silent mode and just saying "yes" to everything is not a good idea.

Any installation can request to be run in administrator mode. If it is run that way the elevation switches off registry virtualization and gives install program access all areas, with registry entries for all users, full guns blazing, even revise rights of all other administrators on the system. Once installation ends the elevated user is "dropped back" from "admin olympus" down to just being Administrator without administrative rights. So far so good.

The scenario of silent UAC however creates funny issue: (which is actually very old problem, actively overlooked on every possible mention) because installer run as admin can become "Admin Elevated over itself" a simple installation of the proverbial winzip or a game can request access to just about anything, anywhere, any registry part, load kernel drivers, what have you.

Now, if you run UAC in normal mode, you get popup and if you actually read it you might ask yourself - why does this software needs to be installed as adminstrator. What is it that this game, which I install in, say c:\games needs to do to my protected and system folders and why should I agree to it putting its dirty fingers and stirring exes and dll's around my system? Right?

But if you run UAC in silent mode, it will just say yes. Under certain conditions, you could double click on installation of, let's say a screensaver or rotation and not knowing what that installer is doing (with UAC clicking just nodding in the background) end up with the following funny situation:
Folder with files created and owned by Administrator v0n, to which access for any Administrator on the machine was revoked Elevated Administrator v0n, (that includes access denied for the Administrator v0n himself), recursive or otherwise. Files in such dir are then invisible to regular search, possibly invisible if you don't have "show all files" options clicked, be executable but non deletable, impossible to edit or check for any Administrator including owner. It's also easy, just using permissions to make such utility or prog to uninstall from control panel but not remove files other than entry in Programs and Features. This is all because of the "any cardinal can be holier than pope" paradoxal user ladder in Vista.
blackhole.jpg


Without UAC on at all, of course, you are absolute power, so you click it and delete it. With UAC silent you need to ask yourself for special permission to add yourself a right to change your rights to the folder and files you, yourself created then disallowed yourself any rights to by being your elevated self... emm... well... I think you get the picture. That kind of malarky just goes "whoosh" above typical user's understanding of things like a Tie Fighter in full combat mode.

So my advice still stands - if you must use the box as Admin then either have UAC on, and read what it wants, question the requests and act accordingly or be power player - have view all files and folders on and absolute power on the box just so you can wipe troublemaking stuff with ease.
 
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Nathan please, how is preventing admin from uninstalling software part of secure design? This is crucial design failure - either let's have a sandbox installation system, or let's not treat unistall files, the only clean way out, as critical system files. All the neccessary mechanisms are built into windows, you have restore points and (bad, but still) permission elevation, all it needs to do is run test stage - will this prog install, if no, then let's display "this program will not install with UAC in silent mode, try running it as administrator" rather than allow it to write to registry and then fail miserably inserting mechanism responsible for uninstalling it.
Because on Vista even if you are part of the Administrators user group you aren't actually always running with Administrator privileges. This is by design and if you think about it is actually quite a good design. It means that on Windows there is no super duper user account like "root" on Unix. It means that on Windows all accounts, even Administrator, are being supervised by the OS. You have to understand that Microsoft has backward compatibility and user friendliness to contest with whereas Unix doesn't really. So Microsoft's approach to least-user privilege is always going to be different to another OS that operates in a much smaller market.

If it didn't grant it any slack it wouldnt' be an issue. But what it does is allow it to install and then cut off possibility for Administrator, out of all users, to have any control over it. It's not that it prevents something from being installed, it's a problem with which element of the software it decides to refuse. What it does is a lot like letting bank robbers to enter the building, take all the money, kill all the hostages and then walk away, while police is surrounded tightly with wall of bulletproof glass "for their own protection" and bullets removed, just so they don't hurt themselves while shooting bad guys.
Again I don't really see the issue here. And I don't think your bank robber analogy really matches up to the scenario with UAC. The installation screwed up, so of course the uninstallation isn't going to go smoothly. Especially when it's some crap installer that blatently isn't transactional like an MSI Windows Installer is. If an MSI Windows Installer has any problems whatsoever during the install it will perform a "rollback" so that the software isn't installed in an inconsistent state. Again it sounds like you are blaming UAC when really you should be blaming that utterly crap install program.

At the end of the day it's a very simple dilema - is UAC supposed to protect your system or is it supposed to pretend to protect it, only if software follows certain rules and etiquette. If it's supposed to protect your system then it should remove all bits of the software in question after unsuccessful installation. Not just block ways to uninstall it.
I think you've misunderstood what I said about UAC supporting MSI Windows Installers better than some dodgy installer. UAC never "pretends" to protect your system - it applies the rules consistently no matter what the software. In certain cases it will grant more slack to certain types of applications (generally this is installers/uninstallers) - such as MSI's. But yes there is no doubt about that "silent mode" does reduce what it does very considerably. I never said otherwise though. Silent mode is for Windows power users only.

Clearly this particular application (IrfanView) was not designed for Vista. If it was then it would have installed and uninstalled just fine.

And I hope "no water pistol contest" policy will remain active. My turn of phrase might not always be the most fortunate or gramatically correct (it's quite obvious English is not my first language) and so if you felt attacked at any point in any of our conversations, I apologize, it wasn't my intention and I would like you to keep in mind, now and always- just because I don't agree with you on some aspect of technology it doesn't mean I'm attacking you personally.
So calling me a "brat" and numerous other profanities was just lost in translation was it? ;)

Then you know user elevation in unix just works. There is no special magic or complication to it. The person invoking administrative command either does so as root or doesn't have opportunity to perform it. There is no "do it as half admin, sandbox will say yes in a background and half of it will be done while the other half fails" aspect to it and never will be.
UAC, I can only presume was meant to be the simple, clean sudo equivalent for windows permission system, but instead it just does this bizarre excercise of striping Admin of his level for most tasks rather than introducing clean distinction between what admin should do and what should remain in hands of regular user.
I don't agree. Unix has a very simplistic elevation model (and indeed security model overall) that is barely even comparable to Windows NT's. With Unix's elevation model you simply elevate the ENTIRE process. And from that point on the process runs with elevated rights. This is not how UAC works, as you well know. However the basic "sudo"-like option is there just by right-clicking the file and choosing "Run as Administrator"...

I'm not knocking the Unix way, sometimes the simple way is the best way. And indeed it works just fine for what Unix needs. But Windows is a much bigger OS with the widest market of any OS and therefore it has different requirements.

But let me give you another example why UAC in silent mode and just saying "yes" to everything is not a good idea.
Well to be honest this is beginning to state the obvious. I've said numerous times that UAC in silent mode is not for average joes. It's for power users that don't want to lose Protected Mode IE.

Any installation can request to be run in administrator mode. If it is run that way the elevation switches off registry virtualization and gives install program access all areas, with registry entries for all users, full guns blazing, even revise rights of all other administrators on the system. Once installation ends the elevated user is "dropped back" from "admin olympus" down to just being Administrator without administrative rights. So far so good.
Yes but the user would have to specifically request that. Silent mode definately wouldn't cause that automatically.

The scenario of silent UAC however creates funny issue: (which is actually very old problem, actively overlooked on every possible mention) because installer run as admin can become "Admin Elevated over itself" a simple installation of the proverbial winzip or a game can request access to just about anything, anywhere, any registry part, load kernel drivers, what have you.
Yes but again the user would need to set their UAC into silent mode. And even in silent mode there are still a number of restrictions on what software can do (as you found out with the IrfanView installer). It definately isn't going to let it load kernel drivers or access critical parts of the registry.

That "funny issue" is just called inheritence. If a process (say the installer) starts a process then that process inherits its privileges from its parent process. This is why MSI Windows Installer should always be used. Because an MSI will pass to its child processes unelevated privileges, delibrately. So that when the program starts up from the "start this program when setup is finished" box is ticked that program doesn't get to run with the elevated Administrator rights.

That kind of malarky just goes "whoosh" above typical user's understanding of things like a Tie Fighter in full combat mode.
Power users that have UAC in silent mode aren't "typical users" are they?
 
I deleted your post because it's not really for discussion on these forums.

Please contact another don if you want to make a complaint.
 
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