New public enemy number one: deflation
Although risks remain small, deflation can no longer be ruled out. Deflation refers to a sustained fall in the general price level
across the economy – not to be confused with the cyclical moderation in inflationary pressures now underway. Testifying before the
Treasury Select Committee last week, Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, said that the UK would see “deflation come to
pass” if problems in the financial sector intensified. This is a significant change. As recently as September, Mr King wrote that “inflation
is likely to remain markedly above the target until well into 2009.”
This reflects the seismic shift in inflation expectations in just three months (chart 1), driven predominantly by two factors. First,
commodity prices have fallen even more quickly than they rose in the start of the year – a barrel of oil now costs $45, down 70% in just
five months (chart 2). Second, and equally importantly, the negative feedback loop from the crisis in financial markets to the wider
economy has hit with a vengeance. Demand is weakening rapidly, keeping a cap on firms’ desire to raise prices. At the same time,
unemployment is increasing, which will tame workers’ efforts to push for higher wages.
Inflation can be bad, but deflation is much worse
Deflation can turn a bad situation into something more serious. A sustained decrease in the general price level depresses activity
in two ways. Most obviously, it makes people postpone big-ticket purchases. After all, why would anyone shop today if they think that
prices for goods and services will be lower tomorrow? While not buying makes sense from an individual’s perspective, the aggregate
effect is to choke demand, prompting firms to lay off staff. In aggregate households lose more from higher unemployment than they
gain from lower prices – this is what the renowned economist John Maynard Keynes called the ‘paradox of thrift’.
The second negative effect is that it increases the burden of outstanding debt. The amount of money that people owe, in real
terms, increases over time when prices fall. Using a hypothetical example, if people borrow £100 for one year at zero interest, but
prices drop by 50%, then the real cost of debt has doubled (as the £100 can now buy twice as many goods and services as a year
earlier). Put differently, when prices and wages fall, it becomes tougher to service a given amount of nominal debt. With the real cost of
debt increasing and repayments becoming more difficult, more loans go bad, dealing yet another blow to the financial system.
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) will do whatever it takes
Official interest rates could reach zero before they succeed in reflating the economy. Lower policy rates aren’t translating
smoothly into lower real borrowing costs for households and firms (chart 3). This means that the Base Rate has to fall by more than
under more normal circumstances. Moreover, the widespread weakness in the wider economy puts further downward pressure on
policy rates. These two factors together could drive the Base Rate towards zero, at which point conventional rate cuts have gone as far
as they can.
But that doesn’t mean policymakers are powerless. When official interest rates approach zero, the Bank of England is likely to start
using more creative measures to spur activity. One approach, already underway in the US, is to buy outstanding government and
private sector debt using freshly printed money, explicitly targeting borrowing costs across the economy. While almost certain to avert
deflation, running the printing press is not a one way bet – if sustained for too long, it could lead to galloping inflation further out. But
faced with the mavity of the ‘deflation scenario’, inflation worries will likely have to wait for another day.