WTF? Well i was never taught that. Not sure there is much truth in that, sounds like properganda or a play on words.
But if it is true then... well, it wouldnt surprise me.
The Allies' original plan was to soften up the Japanese mainland with a few weeks of carpet bombing in advance of a
possible invasion. Meanwhile, Russia had declared war on Japan and was keen to invade regardless of what anyone else was doing. The Yanks knew this too; indeed, one of the arguments made in favour of the A-bomb was that it would intimidate Russia and keep her out of Japan.
For her part, Japan was desperate to end the war as soon as possible because she knew that she could not resist the Allied bombing campaign, let alone a Russian invasion.
Source please Mr Propaganda
Firstly, it is rather stupid to accuse someone of propaganda simply because you're ignorant of the historical minutiae.
The surrender of Japan in August 1945 brought World War II to a close. By August 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy effectively ceased to exist, and an Allied invasion of Japan was imminent.
While publicly stating their intent to fight on to the bitter end, Japan's leaders at the Supreme War Council (the "Big Six") were privately making entreaties to the Soviet Union to mediate peace on terms favorable to the Japanese. The Soviets, meanwhile, were preparing to attack the Japanese, in fulfillment of their promise to the Americans and the British made at the Yalta Conference.
Wiki.
The Allies had broken Japanese codes, and were freely eavesdropping on their communications with Russia; consequently, they knew what Japan and Russia were saying to each other. In fact, the Russians were completely open about it; we know this because President Harry Truman tells us in his own hand written diary:
President Harry S Truman said:
July 18, 1945
Discussed Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. (Churchill) of telegram from Jap emperor asking for peace…
So Churchill and Truman were both aware that Japan had already offered her surrender - a full
19 days before the first A-bomb was dropped. This is historical fact.
Secondly, the traditional argument - "we
had to drop the bomb; there was no other way" - is predicated upon the joint premises that (a) the Japanese would never surrender unless bombed to oblivion, and (b) invasion was necessary. Both premises are false.
Japan had lost her capacity to attack other nations; her armed forces were totally landlocked; she was no threat to anyone. She was in a siege situation; the Allies could have just sat down and waited for the flag to go up. They knew that she was already trying to surrender; there was no need to continue fighting, and certainly no need to invade. What purpose would an invasion serve, except to ensure the deaths of more Japanese civilians? None that I can see.
Truman knew that Japan was trying to surrender, and freely admitted this to his advisers. The Allies were aware that a Russian attack on Japan was imminent (which was precisely why Japan was trying to negotiate a surrender via Moscow) and if they wanted to win the war, they could do so simply by sitting on their hands for a month or two.
Most of the American top brass were
against the decision to use atomic power against the Japanese, and said so at the time.
Henry Arnold (commanding general of the US Army Air Forces) said:
The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air.
[...]
It always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse
[...]
When the question comes up of whether we use the atomic bomb or not, my view is that the Air Force will not oppose the use of the bomb, and they will deliver it effectively if the Commander in Chief decides to use it. But it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion.
Ralph Bard said:
During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender.
Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.
I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in this country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out.
Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker said:
Arnold's view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it.
William D. Leahy said:
Once it had been tested, President Truman faced the decision as to whether to use it. He did not like the idea, but he was persuaded that it would shorten the war against Japan and save American lives. It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.
[...]
My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make wars in that fashion, and that wars cannot be won by destroying women and children
General Dwight D. Eisenhower said:
I voiced to him [the Secretary of War] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was at that very moment seeking some way to surrender with a minimum of loss of 'face'
President Herbert Hoover said:
I told [US General] MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria.
Examples could be multiplied. You will find more detail
here.
