The Somalis needed those hostages alive for a ransom. They couldn't afford to kill them. (In fact, have they ever killed hostages?) The French have rescued hostages from Somali pirates in the past, so it can be done. To quote your own words: "A slight show of power and the job is done."
That is not the explanation that was given. They did not deny that they had the firepower and capacity to intervene; they simply said that they judged it to be too risky.
As for the last point, you are right the Royal Marines should've defiantly fired at the 6 Iranian ships with the small arms from their RH inflatable boats. HMS Cornwall wasn't standing around next to them, the marines were inspecting a ship in waters too shallow for the warship to enter. By the time anyone realised what happened the British personnel were on Iranian soil.
They didn't need to fire. They should have used their superior speed and manouverability to outrun the boats and return to HMS Cornwall. Instead they just gave up and spent the next 12 days spilling their guts to Iran. Royal Marines? Pffft. Cheese eating surrender monkeys.
This is how my countrymen deal with dodgy Iranians:
CANBERRA (Reuters) - Australian navy sailors used "colourful language" and aggressive tactics to repel five Iranian gunboats in an incident prior to the capture of 15 British sailors in March, Australian defence officials said on Friday.
Five Iranian Revolutionary Guard gunboats surrounded an Australian boarding party in the Gulf during a routine stop-and-search of the cargo boat MV Sham in December 2004.
"Colourful language was the word. As Australians we might well imagine what (language) was there, but the important thing to note was that it worked," Royal Australian Navy Commodore Steve Gilmore told reporters.
The Australians were boarding the vessel from the missile frigate HMAS Adelaide, on patrol with U.S.-led coalition forces after the Iraq war, when the incident occurred.
The Australian commander ordered his sailors back onto the cargo vessel and into defensive weapons positions in a four-hour confrontation from which the Iranians eventually backed away. No shots were fired, Gilmore said.
British media reports have questioned why lessons were not learned from the Australian incident.
Five Iranian Revolutionary Guard gunboats surrounded an Australian boarding party in the Gulf during a routine stop-and-search of the cargo boat MV Sham in December 2004.
"Colourful language was the word. As Australians we might well imagine what (language) was there, but the important thing to note was that it worked," Royal Australian Navy Commodore Steve Gilmore told reporters.
The Australians were boarding the vessel from the missile frigate HMAS Adelaide, on patrol with U.S.-led coalition forces after the Iraq war, when the incident occurred.
The Australian commander ordered his sailors back onto the cargo vessel and into defensive weapons positions in a four-hour confrontation from which the Iranians eventually backed away. No shots were fired, Gilmore said.
British media reports have questioned why lessons were not learned from the Australian incident.
(Source).
Gilmore goes on to say that this incident wasn't identical to the British one, but the only real difference is that the Iranians didn't seem intent on capturing the Australian troops. In every other respect, it was identical: military personnel on a few inflatables, caught searching a cargo vessel and subsequently surrounded by Iranian gunboats. They were outnumbered and outgunned, as was their support vessel. But what a difference in the outcome!
