From all accounts this cant be another chernobyl
It could mean that the surrounding area will become an exclusion zone much like the area around chernobyl due to extreme radiation exposure.
This is turning into a real disaster.
And from day 1, I've listened to numerous so called Nuclear power experts saying...... "the Japanese reactors are well prepared for these eventualities"...."the fuel rods are secure and cooled & they know what to do if they are exposed etc"
And even last night on the 10 o'clock news, yet another expert was spouting something along the lines of "there's no risk of fire" - and yet 6 hours later theres another explosion and a fire.
Why didn't they just admit the seriousness of the damage from the start, and get some major support in there ?
What's the likelihood of the Japanese Govt handing out radiation pills?
Presumably they have them stockpiled....
levels of radiation will be so high and dangerous no one will be able to secure the others and armageddon will ensue!
Sorry if I have missed something here but does it not seem a little foolish in the first place building nuclear powerstations in an area so prone to earthquakes?
Awful situation and I hope it is not as serious as it seems
They may well be prepaired for cooling it, but if the cooling systems fail as they have, what are they to do then.
I think anymore damage to the reactors and its game over, at the moment they have 3 reactors that are badly damaged with cooling systems that have either completely failed or not functioning correctly, something is going to give and if one reactor goes the levels of radiation will be so high and dangerous no one will be able to secure the others and armageddon will ensue!
the earth quake was not the issue, had it jsut been an eq they would have been fine...
the lack of power once the generators were washed away by the wave is where things started to go wrong...
Boiling Water Reactor Containments
The primary containment package provided for a particular product line is dependent upon the vintage
of the plant and the cost-benefit analysis performed prior to the plant being built. During the evolution
of the boiling water reactors, three major types of containments were built. The major containment
designs are the Mark I (page 3-16), Mark II (page 3-17), and the Mark III (page 3-18). Unlike the Mark
III, that consists of a primary containment and a drywell, the Mark I and Mark II designs consist of a
drywell and a wetwell (suppression pool). All three containment designs use the principle of pressure
suppression for loss of coolant accidents. The primary containment is designed to condense steam and
to contain fission products released from a loss of coolant accident so that offsite radiation doses
specified in 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded and to provide a heat sink and water source for certain safetyrelated
equipment.
The Mark I containment design consists of several major components, many of which can be seen on
page 3-16. These major components include:
• The drywell, which surrounds the reactor vessel and recirculation loops,
• A suppression chamber, which stores a large body of water (suppression pool),
• An interconnecting vent network between the drywell and the suppression chamber, and
• The secondary containment, which surrounds the primary containment (drywell and suppression
pool) and houses the spent fuel pool and emergency core cooling systems.
The Mark II primary containment consists of a steel dome head and either a post-tensioned concrete wall
or reinforced concrete wall standing on a base mat of reinforced concrete. The inner surface of the
containment is lined with a steel plate that acts as a leak-tight membrane. The containment wall also
serves as a support for the floor slabs of the reactor building (secondary containment) and the refueling
pools. The Mark II design is an over-under configuration. The drywell, in the form of a frustum of a
cone or a truncated cone, is located directly above the suppression pool. The suppression chamber is
cylindrical and separated from the drywell by a reinforced concrete slab. The drywell is topped by an
elliptical steel dome called a drywell head. The drywell inerted atmosphere is vented into the
suppression chamber through as series of downcomer pipes penetrating and supported by the drywell
floor.
The Mark III primary containment consists of several major components, many of which can be seen on
page 3-18. The drywell (13) is a cylindrical, reinforced concrete structure with a removable head. The
drywell is designed to withstand and confine steam generated during a pipe rupture inside the
containment and to channel the released steam into the suppression pool (10) via the weir wall (11) and
the horizontal vents (12). The suppression pool contains a large volume of water for rapidly condensing
steam directed to it. A leak tight, cylindrical, steel containment vessel (2) surround the drywell and the
suppression pool to prevent gaseous and particulate fission products from escaping to the environment
following a pipe break inside containment.
A PDF has been going round work which contains the design of the GE BWR reactor and details its cooling and protection systems, interesting read, i will try and upload some screen captures today.
I'm not that up on the Nuclear side of our business but we have about 20 guys hear who vary from plant design / commissioning / control systems and finally 8 ex submariners who all specilised in reactor safety and maintenance of the subs whilst at sea.
Things are looking much more serious this morning, i feel very sorry for all those in Japan right now.
Dolph said:Let's get some perspective, firstly, no matter what happens, this situation cannot turn into a chernobyl, the conditions, reactor type, use of containment and so on prevent it. The worst case scenario (which may have already happened according to reports this morning) is that the containment unit of the reactor, or one of the fuel cooling ponds is breached.