If hackers would have a field day, why don’t they already have a field day with:
Your HMRC records
Your DWP records
Your NHS record
Your DVLA record
Your MI5/6 record
Your home office record
Your police record
Your local council record
Your electoral registration
Personal records from all of those databases have been compromised in the past. There is also a serious risk from corrupt employees who have access to national government databases. Data held by the NHS Summary Care Record has been compromised that way in the past.
The DVLA has a spotty history of competently maintaining their driving license database. I remember when they "lost" the driving license details of thousands of law-abiding people who had motorcycle driving licenses and the only option they gave those people was to retake their driving tests!
The thing you fail to grasp is that the new digital ID database will collate data from all the above databases on to a single database (equivalent to the old National Identity Register - NIR - database) which will make it far more vulnerable to theft. In effect, it's like putting all your eggs in one basket. If it gets compromised you are stuffed.
For example, at the moment when logging into the Government Gateway the extra security they have requires you to supply details of your UK-issued driving license and passport etc. If a fraudster wanted to impersonate you to get in there they would at least need copies of your driving license and passport, plus they would need to have stolen/cloned your mobile phone SIM card (for the 2FA OTP). But if they couldn't get access to your personal documents then they would need information from two disparate government databases held by different departments. The issue with the proposed digital ID system is that once your driving license/passport serial numbers, start/expiry dates etc are added to a future NIR equivalent all the identity thief/fraudster would need to victimise you is compromised data from a single government database.
The government has a terrible history of securing its databases. If they put all our personal data (including fingerprints. iris scans and 3D facial scans) with cross-references to all our interactions with the state on to a single database with a million points-of-entry it's bound to eventually get hacked or compromised by an insider and its data stolen. Frankly, I don't trust them to do it safely and maintain its security.
The prevention of small boats arrivals justification is clearly disingenuous nonsense, just as the prevention of
al Qaeda terror attacks in the UK (which were done by "clean skins", including a school teacher on 7/7) was a good cover story to justify Blair's national ID card scheme.
A large number of European countries operate ID card system, last time I checked none of those operated like North Korea.
Yes, but you cannot extrapolate the situation with national ID cards in other countries to how they will be used in the UK. Go and read the "Identity Cards Act 2006" for an example of how over-the-top the British national digital ID scheme is likely to be. For example, the last NIDC scheme had a £2,500 fine for failing to attend your biometric data collection interview (on each occasion).
Few other European countries had NIDC schemes that went as far as that one. For example, in Germany, the British 2006-10 NIDC scheme would have actually been illegal due to legislation explicitly passed after World War 2 to prevent any risk of a repeat of the Holocaust. That was because of the collation of information from disparate sources on the NIR database and the policy to use the NIRN (NIR's unique personal identifier) to create a meta-database of all our interactions with private sector entities.
If someone want to come into the UK illegally....they know they have to stay under the radar; not having an ID card is so far down the list of criteria that it means nothing and is not a deterrent, it is not even close.
Most of the illegal immigrants to the UK apply for political asylum shortly after they get here. That way they get free accommodation and a living allowance. A minority disappear into the black market. For example, many Albanian and Vietnamese illegal immigrants who had paid people-smugglers ended up working on cannabis farms etc. For the latter group, a national digital ID scheme would be irrelevant as they steer clear of reputable employers/landlords and government agencies. It might make life harder for asylum seekers who are working illegally (Deliveroo riders etc), but much cheaper targeted rules at that occupation would achieve the same result
70 million in country. wont make a blind bit of difference.
Yes, but there has to be some mechanism for the public to lawfully and publicly show their disapproval for this policy (letters to MPs are private and are just brushed off). It was not in the last Labour Party manifesto, so it can be argued that Starmer resurrecting this policy from 2006 without any warning and using his huge Parliamentary majority to force it through is unreasonable.
My partner is Polish and she has had an ID card for more than a decade, she can use this to travel with and not need to carry her passport, EU countries only.
National ID cards from EU countries inside the Schenghen Area can be used for travel between those countries, but that is irrelevant to any future UK NID scheme as we are not in the EU. The ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) set the international standards for passports and no national ID cards meet them, so our NID scheme will never be used for international travel.
Yes, a lot of benefit fraud is by overseas (and domestic) organised criminals using stolen/forced documents/identities to claim U.K. welfare payments.
About three times more benefit money went unclaimed last year in the UK than was stolen by fraudsters. But once the government starts fingerprinting and interviewing law-abiding British citizens like common criminals you can be sure than many more people will claim every penny of benefits they are entitled to. Hence, it may actually cause a net increase in the benefits bill.