Thus, despite the privilege, individuals might sometimes be required to answer questions or provide information or documents which might incriminate them. In those circumstances it was not submitted that the privilege against self incrimination was absolute, nor that the offence created in the context of RIPA 2000, Pt III was incompatible with Art 6 of the Convention.
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On analysis, the key which provided access to protected data, like the data itself, existed separately from each appellant’s will. Even if it was true that each created his own key, once created, the key to the data, remained independent of the defendant’s will even when it was retained only in his memory, at any rate until it was changed. If investigating officers were able to identify the key from a different source no one would argue that the key was not distinct from the equipment which was to be accessed, and indeed the individual who owned the equipment and knew the key to it. Again, if the arresting officers had arrived at the premises immediately after a defendant had completed the process of accessing his own equipment enabling them to identify the key, the key itself would have been a piece of information existing, at that point, independently of the defendant himself and would have been immediately available to the police for their use in the investigation. In that sense the key to the computer equipment was no different to the key to a locked drawer. The contents might or might not be incriminating: the key was neutral. In the instant case the prosecution was in possession of the drawer: it could not, however, gain access to the contents.