Windows 7 UAC

I've no idea what I'm doing in this utility. Overclocker-ware scares me. What do the flames mean? :eek:

the flames mean nothing until you configure the desired temperatures. then the flame means that the current temp is higher than the desired temp you set.

speedfan is excellent, but definitely confusing at first. finding the configuration options you want is not straightforward (until you know where they are!)

I wouldn't call it an OC app tho... I used it to silence my CPU fan when the computer was idle, nothing related to OC'ing at all :)
 
Ok, I'll be giving it a go right after this L4D game finishes as a reboot will be required :p

If this works and none of my other utilities break under UAC then I will just leave UAC on but on the low option.

If by low you mean the never notify option then I don't think that's actually more secure than having it disabled.
 
The low option only notifies you but won't dim the desktop and be annoying for third party apps that try to be smrt!

The option below it is Never notify (off)
 
In theory UAC would be excellent additional security, if the defaults were decent. In reality the defaults allow anyone to easily bypass it. It is still not at all comparable to *nix, BSD or pretty much any secure system. This issue has been massively complained about since the beta. Nothing has been done. Further information
You can almost effortlessly write a virus that bypasses UAC at the default setting, defeating the point of it.

Quote from the linked site above:

"So the advice remains as before:

If you are using Windows 7 and want to be protected against silent elevation then turn UAC up to the highest level.

However, I would add to that advice:

If, on the other hand, you don't care about silent elevation then you should turn down UAC to Elevate Without Prompting -- so that UAC is still enabled but it never prompts you -- because the default level isn't buying you much except a few pointless prompts which can be bypassed by any program which wants to."

Hope this helps someone that was not aware of the ongoing issue.
 
Aren't those "few pointless prompts" just as simple to execute as typing "sudo" into a CLI?

Don't see *nix as any more secure tbh.
 
It's no secret that Microsoft punched some holes in the default UAC settings on Windows 7 in order to make it more friendly. At the end of the day they got a big lashing on Vista for how tight its security was. They had to respond to the market and they did so in Windows 7. Yes W7's UAC is not as secure (by default) as Vista's was. But it is still very secure. Because the largest entry point for malware these days is via the web browser. IE8 in W7 is still fully locked down by default.

To say it is not "comparable" with *nix/BSD security models is rather oxymoron to be honest. It's as though you believe that these operating systems have never had a local privilege escalation vulnerability, ever? And that these operating systems (particularly some of the more user-friendly variants) contain no security compromises in order to improve usability?

This was a delibrate change by Microsoft to improve usability in W7. If you don't like it, simply increase your UAC level to the highest OR don't run as an Administrator - run as a Standard User instead. This will put it back into the rock solid mode that Vista used.
 
OK so Speedfan does report the temps now, something must have changed since the last time I used it - most likely updated the chipset/intel matrix storage drier - all good though.

But why (even on the lowest setting) do apps like MPC-HC ask for permission when I run them even when I have them set to run as Administrator? Insanely annoying having to click OK to allow it every time I play a video file.

I know it's an unsigned application and everything but I know it's not unsafe... This is why I turn off UAC.
 
MPC-HC doesn't need elevation. I use it all the time perfectly without elevation. Same with VLC.

When you tick the "Run as administrator" check box on the Compatibility tab of a program. All this does is force the program to prompt for elevation at startup, every time. Which can be useful for apps which you accidently run, realise you needed to elevate to make it do anything useful, then have to shut down and restart it elevated. It just saves all the hassle of right-click etc.

PS: Clicking Yes/Continue is nothing. I have my UAC configured to require a full password entry :p And yet I don't find this annoying at all. It's just called being secure. *nix bods have the same "inconvenience".
 
Hmm I shall retry again :p

My PC has been rebooted more times the last 24 hours than it has the last 6 months!

Edit*

OK I have done this (disabled Run as Admin) for MPC-HC and now it doesn't ask for elevation when loading BUT a new problem has emerged.

With UAC on and run as admin unticked (standard behaviour) MPC-HC cannot save bookmarked videos so you can't save a movie 30minutes in to the bookmarks (Favourites > Add to favourites) - you can click it but when you visit Favourites there's no new entry.

With UAC on and MPC-HC set to run as admin you get elevation prompt when loading so you click OK, now when you go to save a video to favouritesit saves fine and everything.

So in order to be able to save favourites you must run MPCHD as admin every time or set it to automatically run as admin in the compatibility tab in which case it asks for permission every time.

You can see how this got tedious previously and remains tedious!
 
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I completely understand the point of introducing UAC to get developers to write applications correctly, however they should understand that lots of software that's already out there is not written to those standards.

That was the entire point of User Account Control though, to get software vendors to fix their applications.

I think what they should have done is introduced UAC in Vista with a white list, and then had UAC in 7 without a whitelist, thus giving devs time to switch stuff around. They ended up bring out 7 much sooner after Vista than intended when Vista was released so should have had a whitelist in the too.

If software developers were that inclined in fixing their applications, they would have done it already.

Mark Russinovich said:
End users have been asking for Windows to provide a way to add arbitrary applications to the auto-elevate list since the Windows Vista beta. The commonly cited reason is that some third-party application they frequently use forces them to constantly click through an elevation prompt as part of their daily routine. Windows 7, just like Windows Vista, doesn't provide such a capability. We understand the aggravation, and there might be a legitimate reason that those applications can't run without administrative rights, but the risk is too high that developers will avoid fixing their code to work with standard user rights. Even if the list of what applications get auto-elevated was only accessible by administrators, developers might simply change their application setup program, which requires a one-time elevation, to add their application to the list. We've instead chosen to invest in educating and working closely with application developers to ensure their programs work correctly as a standard user.

Inside Windows 7 User Account Control

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i just turned it off on my pc....is that a bad thing to do?

It will mean you will be routinely running as an administrator, which isn't the smartest thing to do. Taking a slight different direction now, it will also mean if you would like to run in a standard user account, every time you need to perform an operation which requests administrator rights, you will be forced to switch to an administrative account. However, with User Account Control enabled, you will have convenient access to administrator rights from a standard user account. You also get the benefit of the Integrity Mechanism / User Interface Privilege Isolation and there is also File and Registry Virtualization.

Personally, I switch to a dedicated administrator account whenever I need to perform an administrative based operation with the elevation dialogues disabled for administrator as well as standard user accounts. I can accept the way I have configured my system won't be for everyone but I'm perfectly happy to use my system the way I have set it up.

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If my machine fails me i can reinstall as i only use standard programs and an admin pack. What are the benefits of UAC? I had a quick read about software is being developed for standard user access but couldnt see how that would make anything more secure.

The less and less software which requires administrators rights to work correctly, more and more users will find running as a standard user more convenient and we can finally shift out of this administrative model Windows users have been stuck in for so long.

It's a fact that using a standard user account is securer than using an administrator accounts on a daily basis. If we take a simple scenario such as the following - If you are running in an administrator account and lets say for instance a vulnerability in your web browser is exploited which allowed for arbitrary code execution, that piece of code will be running in the administrator context and can easily take over the entire machine.

However, if you are running in a standard user account, that piece of code will be constrained to standard user rights and it will be a lot more difficult for the attacker to take over your machine. Though, malware can still cause a great deal of damage simply with standard user rights since it will mean it will have access to all of your data.

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I always turn it off....but the other week I had a massive malware infestation that appeared from nowhere, so I'm wondering if having UAC on would have prevented it.

I'm assuming when you say "UAC on", you are referring to running as an administrator with User Account Control enabled i.e. using the Protected Administrator account.

It depends on the type of malware. If the malware assumes administrator rights and even if you wasn't using a web browser which takes advantage of the integrity mechanism in Windows Vista and Windows 7 such as Internet Explorer and Google Chrome, or the malware came via a different route such as a USB drive, running as a Protected Administrator would have likely helped you.

However, if the malware wasn't stupid and was written to take advantage of the opportunities the elevations present from a Protected Administrator account, if it came through your web browser either because it escaped Internet Explorer or Google Chrome's sandbox or you were using a different web browser, or it the malware came through a different route like a USB drive as mentioned above, then User Account Control wouldn't have helped you. This is also assuming the infection was in the administrator context.

If the infection was at a standard user level, User Account Control would have only helped if you were using Internet Explorer or Google Chrome and providing the sandbox contained it. However, if you wasn't using one of those browsers or the malware infected your system via a different method, User Account Control wouldn't have helped you either.

It's important to remember though that User Account Control in the form of the Protected Administrator account is not for security and it's certainly not an anti-malware solution. Any security benefit you do get is a side effect of it's primary purpose. The real security benefit you get from User Account Control is enabling you to run a security feature known as standard user accounts.

Depending on how you like to configure your system, you could say certain aspects of User Account Control actually decease security such as the elevation dialogues. For example, the way I use my system whereby I use a dedicated administrator account for any operations which request administrator rights, if I was elevating from a standard user account instead, I am introducing a security risk. Elevation always involves risk to some degree, it's a convenience, nothing to do with security.
 
Isn't that the whole point of this topic though? to show why daily tasks such as basic media playback are hindered in our favourite apps because of this and until all software has UAC in mind completely the only real solution is to live with it and bang your head several times a day or turn it off - granted the average user may well be less secure with it off but most of us will be no less worse than when we started with it on.
 
Can't say I've ever used MPC-HC's favourites function. But clearly it has a bug in it which is why it doesn't work unless you're an administrator.

No media player software should require admin rights.

The joys of using utilities that people write in their spare time, eh?

Apart from that though MPC-HC works fine without admin rights.
 
Favourites is quite useful especially for saving shows/movies you want to carry on watching later or building a playlist of things to watch from location x etc!
 
Aren't those "few pointless prompts" just as simple to execute as typing "sudo" into a CLI?

Don't see *nix as any more secure tbh.
No, a virus isn't going to "guess" your password. Sudo itself is, by default, shipped requiring a password. If someone changes that (as i'm sure you'll be able to find some distro somewhere that does) then that is their problem, it is not the default. There is no intentional design allowing you to bypass the permissions by default. There may be bugs from time to time (as with all software) but they are fixed.

I only picked *nix because it's an example that everyone recognises. There have been extremely few vulnerabilities with the permissions system itself, btw. This is why it is a good example.

To say it is not "comparable" with *nix/BSD security models is rather oxymoron to be honest. It's as though you believe that these operating systems have never had a local privilege escalation vulnerability, ever? And that these operating systems (particularly some of the more user-friendly variants) contain no security compromises in order to improve usability?
This isn't just a "local privilege escalation". It is an intentional design choice that allows you to bypass the security model, a fundamental flaw. Of course every system has some sort of trade off for ease of use but shipping a model that is by default trivial to bypass is just absurd.

Please do not make up a belief I have not said and I do not hold and state it as though I have.

This was a delibrate change by Microsoft to improve usability in W7. If you don't like it, simply increase your UAC level to the highest OR don't run as an Administrator - run as a Standard User instead. This will put it back into the rock solid mode that Vista used.
You're missing the point, this isn't about what I want, it doesn't effect me directly (I already know about the flaw).

There are two issues here:

1) This was an insecure way to ship it by default - Very few people change the default, we are the extreme minority here. Just the same as running as administrator by default was. This is important because many people are vulnerable in a way all virus writers, script kiddies and crackers can rely on. I cannot think of a single time in history this has occurred without it coming back to bite the users. You may as well still be running as administrator because of this (at the default).

2) There are other ways (better ways) to "improve usability" of the security model than by removing the point of it. As documented in the link I provided, when it is at the default setting (which visually appears high on the bar) this gives an impression of security while providing little to no actual benefit. This is more harmful than good because it misleads people into falsely believing their system is secure (and they take less steps to secure it because of this).​


Edit: As I got the impression that some responses are emotionally rather than factually motivated I feel the need to point out several things:
1) I posted because the information I had was directly relevant to a securing a system with UAC.

2) None of my claims are in any doubt, this has been well documented throughout the beta. I have provided a source (with videos!) and you can try it yourself (it still works).

3) I realise you do not know me but I am not interested in "fanboyism" or other silly forum notions you may be accustomed to, opinion is irrelevant in the face of fact.​
 
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You do know that when you install Windows 7 it specifically asks you for an administrator account username/password and then asks you to create additional accounts for family members and yourself (i.e. Standard User accounts)?

I don't really see what the problem is here. Yes W7's security for Administrator users as regressed a little over what Vista had (I'm assuming you wanted me to acknowledge this for a second time). But fundamentally even running as Administrator on Vista (with UAC) was still not as secure as running as a true Standard User.

W7 promotes Standard User creation just about everywhere. During setup and in the Control Panel after setup.

Believe it or not, most *real* family PC's do actually run with Standard Users. It's only when there's someone in the house whose a bit of a tinkerer who thinks they know better that the whole household ends up running under a single Administrator user account with everyone sharing the same IE Favourites list.


PS: There is no "fanboyism" occuring here. You (and that website's) claims are just a little fantastical. That website is authored in the style of the legendary FUD-spouter "Steve Gibson". The security industry has agreed with Microsoft's point of view. Judging by that website's lack of activity since June 2009 I think it is safe to say that the author has come around?

PPS: Yes the proof of concept works for W7 RTM.
 
No, a virus isn't going to "guess" your password. Sudo itself is, by default, shipped requiring a password. If someone changes that (as i'm sure you'll be able to find some distro somewhere that does) then that is their problem, it is not the default. There is no intentional design allowing you to bypass the permissions by default.

That's great, but seeing as the UAC prompt is a seperate execution space, whatever virus that is trying to manifest itself in your user account has no access to click [YES] or [NO] in the elevation box. So your point is either a) moot, or b) proof that *nix's system is actually MORE likely to be bypassed by a virus (given that it IS possible for a virus to force-guess a root/admin password, but not possible for it to interact with UAC).
 
You do know that when you install Windows 7 it specifically asks you for an administrator account username/password and then asks you to create additional accounts for family members and yourself (i.e. Standard User accounts)?
The problem is that most users (nearly all infact) use a pre-installed system. Example: I picked up a laptop pre-installed with Windows 7 Home Premium without any prompt to make non-administrator user accounts. This will be the experience of a lot of people, the non-technically savvy, the very people affected by viruses.

I don't really see what the problem is here.

W7 promotes Standard User creation just about everywhere. During setup and in the Control Panel after setup.

Believe it or not, most *real* family PC's do actually run with Standard Users. It's only when there's someone in the house whose a bit of a tinkerer who thinks they know better that the whole household ends up running under a single Administrator user account with everyone sharing the same IE Favourites list.
Until all the pre-installed PCs start asking for normal user accounts I don't see this happening somehow. That is the problem. I don't see standard users going out of their way to set up separate accounts. Maybe the more technically savvy users that use a family PC but again a lot of people have individual PCs these days (possibly in addition to a family PC).

There is no "fanboyism" occuring here. You (and that website's) claims are just a little fantastical. That website is authored in the style of the legendary FUD-spouter "Steve Gibson". The security industry has agreed with Microsoft's point of view. Judging by that website's lack of activity since June 2009 I think it is safe to say that the author has come around?

PPS: Yes the proof of concept works for W7 RTM.
Firstly I was making a point that i'm not interested in fanboyism; in that I do not subscribe to it and my post is not to be taken emotionally (as some responses appeared to be emotional), not as an accusation that you do. My posts are intended as they are written.

Secondly, you say the claims made are "fantastical" and then, as you admit, the flaw they refer to works. This is what I meant by emotionally rather than factually motivated response. I'm really not interested in a website layout, I don't see the distraction. I'm simply interested at the facts presented, which by your own admission, are accurate (it works). See the prior misrepresentation of my quote for another example of this.

Thirdly, I don't think you can speak for the security industry as a whole, infact that very industry was the most critical opponent to this during the beta (when they were pushing for a change).

Fourthly, I do not think that you can assume he has changed his mind simply because he has not reposted. Do you assume people just change their mind if they haven't talked about something for a few months? During the time he was posting the issue could have been addressed, it was not. It would be safer to assume that because it will not be changed he has simply stopped caring. The issue is fully documented. I do not see how much more information could be added, anyway.

That's great, but seeing as the UAC prompt is a seperate execution space, whatever virus that is trying to manifest itself in your user account has no access to click [YES] or [NO] in the elevation box. So your point is either a) moot, or b) proof that *nix's system is actually MORE likely to be bypassed by a virus (given that it IS possible for a virus to force-guess a root/admin password, but not possible for it to interact with UAC).
See above, because of the pre-install issue most people simply wont get a prompt, it will just bypass it entirely. Guessing a password on any system, while technically possible, is both challenging because of various execution space and MAC(mandatory access control) issues from Vista, Win 7, SELlinux, App Armor (etc) and is also extremely unlikely (assuming it isn't "password" or "123", that is).

Finally...
I'm sure you could try to blame vendors (generally or individually) for this issue but what it boils down to sadly is an insecure setup for a large amount of users which didn't need to happen. I just think it's a shame because they had a chance to completely change this; at least things are much better than the XP days.
 
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See above, because of the pre-install issue most people simply wont get a prompt, it will just bypass it entirely.

Sorry, but that just isn't true. Whilst we (at work) will re-image every machine that we deploy, I have of course played with most of the pre-imaged systems we recieve from Dell and Lenovo, none of them have UAC set to anything other than the default setting, where it WILL prompt for access to make any system changes.
 
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