Did you read past the introduction paragraph to page 10 and the actual detail of the research? The people who discovered the vulnerability explain why they couldn’t make it work in a browser. That is the research I present to you. Are you saying that part of their research is wrong?
Its the nature of the security whole. It's not like you can run javascript in a VM.
Run some JavaScript code in a "virtual machine":
https://www.w3schools.com/nodejs/ref_vm.asp
Then the attack allows you to break out of the VM and steal secrets. From the website,
As shown in the RIDL paper, an attacker can exploit hardware security vulnerabilities inside the processor to break VM and SGX boundaries. So if you can create and run java code in a VM?
From the white paper,
This primitive by itself is useful in sandbox (e.g., JavaScript) escape scenarios
In particular, by snooping on in-flight data in the CPU, attackers running arbitrary unprivileged code (including JavaScript in the browser) may leak information across arbitrary security boundaries
we presenta number of practical exploits that leak data across many common security boundaries (JavaScript sandbox, process,kernel, VM, SGX, etc.)
we assume the attacker can only run unprivilegedcode on the victim system (e.g., JavaScript sandbox, userprocess, VM, or SGX enclave), but seeks to leak informa-tion across arbitrary privilege levels and address spaces.
as we will show, can also be implemented in managed languages such as JavaScript.
Not to mention that such attacks canbe built even from a sandboxed environment such asJavaScript in the browser
This bypasses side-channel mitigations deployedon all the major operating systems and extends the threatsurface of prior cross-address space speculative executionattacks to managed sandboxes (e.g., JavaScript).
G. JavaScript attacksTo further demonstrate the implications of RIDL, weshow that RIDL can be exploited even within restricted sandboxed environments such as JavaScript
Building a RIDL attack from the browser requires ahigh level of control over the instructions executed by theJavaScript engine. Conveniently,WebAssemblyallows usto generate code which meets these requirements and isavailable as a standard feature in modern browsers. Wefound that we can use WebAssembly in both Firefox andChrome to generate machine code which we can use toperform RIDL-based attacks.
Generating the correct machine code and triggeringthe page fault are relatively straightforward.
Despite these challenges, we successfully implementeda proof-of-concept exploit on top of Firefox’ SpiderMonkeyJavaScript engine to reliably leak data from a victimprocess running on the same system.
So you are wrong, what a surprise. That's you discredited.