Commissario
IIRC it also meant that if the pilots were not aware of it (IIRC the total recommended training on it was something like a single slide in some cases), that if you had a problem noted one flight it would clear up for the next.
It was a design that from what I understand should never have been approved as it went against decades of lessons from incidents with other instruments that only had one or two inputs and no easily comparable redundancy.
From memory the US pilots who had the issue may have had the "dispute" display active (their airlines were not as price sensitive and paid for it rather than taking what the manufacturer classed an "optional" feature as being required for fundamental safety) and additional training on what that dispute display meant.
A large part of the problem was that Boeing played down and basically hid from the pilots what MCAS was and how it worked - it wasn't that pilots from other countries were under qualified but that their training may have been the
level that Boeing said was needed and their employers assumed would be what was needed having trusted the manufacturer of their new aircraft that was meant to fly just like the old one.
Effectively Boeing lied about how much training was required to know how the aircraft differed and what the new systems were.
