(2) There was evidence that H had deliberately ignored the basis of F's consent to penetration as a manifestation of his control over her. As to whether F had consented to the penetration, she had consented provided that she had agreed by choice when she had had the freedom and capacity to make the choice. The evidence relating to 'choice' and 'freedom' to make any particular choice had to be approached in a broad common sense way. If, before penetration had begun, the intervener had made up his mind that he would penetrate and ejaculate within F's vagina, or even if because penetration was a continuing act from entry to withdrawal, he had decided that he would not withdraw at all because he deemed F subservient to his control, F had been deprived of choice relating to the crucial feature on which her original consent to sexual intercourse had been based.
Accordingly, her consent had been negated. Contrary to F's wishes, and knowing that she would not have consented and had not consented to penetration or the continuation of penetration if she had any inkling of his intention, he had deliberately ejaculated within her vagina. In law, that combination of circumstances fell within the statutory definition of rape.
