Free will

[dowie]

I think the point is a little different - what is free will? Is it about whether or not you're allowed to do what you're programmed to do? Or does free will require being able to choose for yourself rather than merely following your programming?

What do you mean by choose for yourself though - surely your "programming" *is* you? Your conscious brain reading this sentence right now and thinking about it is just your programming in action too, yet I don't think anyone here is denying consciousness even if it might be just some deterministic process. (some philosophers actually do try to deny consciousness just as they deny free will).

If not then what is being referred to by "you" - some other entity or thing separate from your brain? A soul? A what? What does "choose for yourself" look like other than you/your brain making choices?

 

[Angilion]

What do you mean by choose for yourself though - surely your "programming" *is* you? Your conscious brain reading this sentence right now and thinking about it is just your programming in action too, yet I don't think anyone here is denying consciousness even if it might be just some deterministic process. (some philosophers actually do try to deny consciousness just as they deny free will).

If not then what is being referred to by "you" - some other entity or thing separate from your brain? A soul? A what? What does "choose for yourself" look like other than you/your brain making choices?

That's part of the point, IMO. If it's wholly deterministic, you aren't making choices any more than, for example, this pen I've just picked up off my desk chooses to fall back down to the desk when I let go of it. So any talk about determinism and making choices is irrelevant because there are no choices in that context. If you can choose, the outcome can't be determined. If the outcome is determined, you can't choose. There is only the illusion of choice caused by ignorance of the predetermined outcome. If it is determined that I will now type "ice cream", then I must type "ice cream". I might think I am choosing to type "ice cream", but that's only because I am ignorant of the fact that it is predetermined that I will type "ice cream" and predetermined that I will think that I chose to do so.

 

[dowie]

That's part of the point, IMO. If it's wholly deterministic, you aren't making choices any more than, for example, this pen I've just picked up off my desk chooses to fall back down to the desk when I let go of it. So any talk about determinism and making choices is irrelevant because there are no choices in that context. If you can choose, the outcome can't be determined. If the outcome is determined, you can't choose. There is only the illusion of choice caused by ignorance of the predetermined outcome. If it is determined that I will now type "ice cream", then I must type "ice cream". I might think I am choosing to type "ice cream", but that's only because I am ignorant of the fact that it is predetermined that I will type "ice cream" and predetermined that I will think that I chose to do so.

What does a real choice look like as opposed to an illusion of choice? I'm not sure that the fact that the choice is deterministic and so could, in theory, be predicted by some all-knowing observer matters her

 

[Irish_Tom]

I think you have probably spent a lot of time on the subject, so I will just pull the "ok" face and back away slowly

More time than is probably sensible. The same could be said for Postmodernism.

I know I said I was going to leave it, but I just can’t help myself.

I don’t think anyone has put forward a clear case for Compatibilism thus far ITT. Although @dowie has done a good job of repeatedly disagreeing with Incompatibilism.

So, to try and answer @Angilion and @Bouton Aide’s earlier question:

Compatibilism, as the name suggests, is the philosophical view that free will is compatible with a deterministic universe. As such, determinism is accepted by most compatibilists and is even central to some compatibilist ideas, although there are different strands of compatibilism, and not all of them insist on determinism.

So how can free will be compatible with a deterministic universe?

The basic form of compatibilism suggests that as long as there is no external factor forcing you to act (like someone holding a gun to your head), then you have free will, regardless of whether your actions are the result of deterministic processes in your head. You had some choices in front of you, and you made one freely. The fact that you would make the same choice every single time if we rewound time and started again (as you would in a deterministic universe) is inconsequential. You had a free choice, and you made it.

IMO, this is the weakest form of compatibilism because it doesn’t address determinism; it just handwaves it away.

Similarly, there’s the compatibilist idea that states that even though your conscious and subconscious thought processes may be deterministic, they are still taking place inside your brain. Therefore, you have free will. I think this is what @dowie is referring to in post #121.

There’s yet another strand of Compatibilism that frames free will in the context of moral responsibility, rather than how most of us in this thread are defining it in terms of conscious control of our thoughts.

Essentially, this is like the way our legal system defines levels of responsibility. So an infant doesn’t have free will. Someone with a brain tumour that affects their behaviour doesn’t have free will. Someone who is old and senile has lost their free will. Someone who is drunk or under the influence of drugs doesn’t have free will at the time — it’s only adults of sound mind who can possess this version of free will.

One of the issues with this form of free will is that there are so many exemptions; the number of people who actually have free will is quite limited. Incompatibilism is universally applied — No one gets to have free will, so it’s much easier to accept.

When you start to combine these strands, they can make a compelling case. If you’re a conscious adult without any behavioural impediments and without any external coercion, then you have choices that you make freely. The process by which you make those choices may be deterministic, but that doesn’t stop you from having free will, especially when framed in the context of moral responsibility.

There are plenty of other branches of Compatibilism, and many of them go to quite convoluted lengths to try and justify free will (as you would expect from philosophers).

In his rebuttal to Sam Harris’ book on free will, Daniel Dennett uses variations of all of the above arguments to refute Harris’s incompatibilist claims. And he is reasonably convincing, but then so is Harris.

It’s interesting that, according to Dennett, the vast majority (80%+) of philosophers are compatibilists, while the majority of scientists are incompatibilists.

He also says that the layman’s interpretation of free will is incorrect, and the philosophers’ version is the accurate one. He may well be right, but it seems somewhat self-fulfilling — “free will exists if you use my definition of it, and your definition is wrong”.

 

[dowie]

I don’t think anyone has put forward a clear case for Compatibilism thus far ITT. Although @dowie has done a good job of repeatedly disagreeing with Incompatibilism.

I provided you with a link that was rather more comprehensive than the post you just made tbh...

 

[Randomface74]

Do you believe that you have free will?

No I'm a slave to money just like everyone else.

 

[Irish_Tom]

I provided you with a link that was rather more comprehensive than the post you just made tbh...

Sure, but a link-and-run to a rather dense academic summary doesn’t tell us what you think about it, which arguments within that summary you agree/disagree with, or why you believe that take is more valid than the other alternative theories.

*Edit* Just to add to the above — if a priest throws a bible at me, that single act it’s unlikely to convert me to Christianity. I need it to be interpreted, I need it explaining and I need persuading.

 

[Tuppy_Glossop]

If time is irrevocably unidirectional, and we are constantly experiencing things, then we are unable to prove or disprove determinism in the mind because we can not exactly recreate those initial conditions. Maybe you could prevent someone from receiving any stimuli and somehow fix their brain's electrochemical state, but this wouldn't be a reflection of determinism in real life. If you could go back in time, would any other outcome even be possible? Would time be replayed faithfully or are there opportunities to jump onto a different timeline/into an alternative universe? If you went back in time, would you retain any memory of experiences after the time you travel back to? This part is more about the nature of time and causality than free will.

On the question of free will, even if you successfully proved determinism in the mind, it is still happening in my mind, so the decision is mine and it is free will. Any lack of conscious direction of that will does not imply another agent. If you want to demonstrate to me that I don't have free will, then you will have to prove that an agent external to my physical self is directing things rather than my own mind doing its thing.

The interesting part seems to be the memory. If certain stimuli can be recognised or situations, actions, and outcomes can be stored, then the intial conditions should never be the same. Also interesting are stock responses to previously unsensed stimuli. Reflexive and instinctive type behaviours.

 

[Angilion]

What does a real choice look like as opposed to an illusion of choice? I'm not sure that the fact that the choice is deterministic and so could, in theory, be predicted by some all-knowing observer matters her

A choice requires the ability to choose, i.e. to have more than one option and to be able to select any one of those options.

The illusion of choice comes when more than one option is presented but you can't select which one you take and you are ignorant of your lack of choice. It's akin to an "election" in which there is only one candidate.

The idea of compatiblism requires defining "choice" to include "no choice but you don't know you don't have a choice". That's why it excludes more obviously forced scenarios such as someone holding a gun to your head and giving you an order - in those scenarios you know you don't have a choice.

[..] On the question of free will, even if you successfully proved determinism in the mind, it is still happening in my mind, so the decision is mine and it is free will. Any lack of conscious direction of that will does not imply another agent. If you want to demonstrate to me that I don't have free will, then you will have to prove that an agent external to my physical self is directing things rather than my own mind doing its thing. [..]

Which is the case in determinism. The external agent is the laws of the universe.

 

[Irish_Tom]

If time is irrevocably unidirectional, and we are constantly experiencing things, then we are unable to prove or disprove determinism in the mind because we can not exactly recreate those initial conditions. Maybe you could prevent someone from receiving any stimuli and somehow fix their brain's electrochemical state, but this wouldn't be a reflection of determinism in real life. If you could go back in time, would any other outcome even be possible? Would time be replayed faithfully or are there opportunities to jump onto a different timeline/into an alternative universe? If you went back in time, would you retain any memory of experiences after the time you travel back to? This part is more about the nature of time and causality than free will.

…

The interesting part seems to be the memory. If certain stimuli can be recognised or situations, actions, and outcomes can be stored, then the intial conditions should never be the same. Also interesting are stock responses to previously unsensed stimuli. Reflexive and instinctive type behaviours.

Apologies for cutting up your quote but these two bits seemed more closely linked to the middle paragraph.

You’re right that this starts to get into a discussion about temporal paradoxes, which is probably over complicating an already complex subject.

As you say, I think the assumption is that if you wanted to prove determinism by re-running time, you couldn’t retain any memories of your current present because you would then be changing the conditions of the period of time you were re-running and it wouldn’t be accurate.

On the question of free will, even if you successfully proved determinism in the mind, it is still happening in my mind, so the decision is mine and it is free will. Any lack of conscious direction of that will does not imply another agent. If you want to demonstrate to me that I don't have free will, then you will have to prove that an agent external to my physical self is directing things rather than my own mind doing its thing.

I think the point about determinism is that it is the external force (for want of a better word) that is directing your mind to do what it’s doing.

 

[dowie]

A choice requires the ability to choose, i.e. to have more than one option and to be able to select any one of those options.

Surely that is what your brain is doing whether deterministic or not... doesn't matter that that choice is predictable - if not then what doe a choice look like under free will? What distinguishes it?

The idea of compatiblism requires defining "choice" to include "no choice but you don't know you don't have a choice". That's why it excludes more obviously forced scenarios such as someone holding a gun to your head and giving you an order - in those scenarios you know you don't have a choice.

Well you do have a choice in that scenario, no one is denying incentives here - you'll probably (very likely) choose to obey the person with a gun because there is a strong incentive to but maybe not - you might think they're bluffing, you might try to fight them etc...

Sure, but a link-and-run

No link and run from my side - you were the one who apparently dropped out of the thread and then returned.
My positon is fine by itself, I don't see the need to label it per se but you seemed oblivious to the idea that people would even have these positions so it was helpful to highlight that it is hardly some random, obscure notion in general.

 

[Angilion]

Surely that is what your brain is doing whether deterministic or not... doesn't matter that that choice is predictable - if not then what doe a choice look like under free will? What distinguishes it?

If the outcome is already determined, you always have only one possible course of action - the one that is determined.
If you have only one possible course of action, you don't have a choice. The essence of a choice is the ability to choose. If you have only one possible course of action you have nothing to choose between. You are incapable of doing anything other than that which is determined.

You're talking about a choice when there is no choice. It isn't a matter of a difference between a choice with free will and a choice without free will. Without free will there is no choice because you can't choose. What distinguishes a choice under free will it is that it exists.

If it's deterministic you can think you're making a choice if you don't know that it's deterministic, but you're not actually making a choice. You will do what is determined and nothing else is possible. The "choice" you make is an illusion born of your ignorance of the reality.

Well you do have a choice in that scenario, no one is denying incentives here - you'll probably (very likely) choose to obey the person with a gun because there is a strong incentive to but maybe not - you might think they're bluffing, you might try to fight them etc...

It was the example given in a compatibalism argument, so I went with it despite its flaws.

The intention, as far as I can tell, was to provide an example of a situation in which you know you don't have a choice.

 

[dowie]

[...]
If it's deterministic you can think you're making a choice if you don't know that it's deterministic, but you're not actually have a choice. You will do what is determined and nothing else is possible. The "choice" you make is an illusion borne of your ignorance of the reality.

This seems a bit circular - it's still *you*/your conscious self making the choice whether or not it is predictable. What does a "real" choice look like here? Simply adding in some randomness - if so why? Or otherwise what needs to be added here to become a "real" choice?

It was the example given in a compatibalism argument, so I went with it despite its flaws.

The intention, as far as I can tell, was to provide an example of a situation in which you know you don't have a choice.

That's fine, I don't necessarily need an example to accept that, I'm happy to accept that there are situations where you don't have a choice. I mean you can choose to stop breathing for example but if you fall unconscious then your brain will automatically breathe for you... just as it does in your sleep. I'd draw a distinction between your brain controlling, for example, your heart beating and your regular breathing from your conscious self making a choice to deliberately increase your breathing or to hold your breath.

 

[Angilion]

[..] Or otherwise what needs to be added here to become a "real" choice?

The existence of a choice. A situation in which you can choose between different options. Actually choose between them, i.e. you can decide which option to take. Not a situation in which the decision is already made for you but you don't know that.

I'll try an analogy with elections standing in for choices:

Scenario 1: The dictator of your country doesn't allow elections. You have no choice in the outcome and you know that. You don't have a vote.
Scenario 2: The dictator of your country allows fake elections in which the votes aren't counted and they always win the election. You have no choice in the outcome but you don't know that. Your vote is an illusion.
Scenario 3: The dictator of your country allows genuine and fair elections, the votes are counted and the candidate with the most votes wins the election. You have a choice in the election. Your vote is a real vote.

 

[dowie]

The existence of a choice. A situation in which you can choose between different options. Actually choose between them, i.e. you can decide which option to take. Not a situation in which the decision is already made for you but you don't know that.

You are actually choosing though, it is your conscious self that is making the decision - just because some observer might, in theory, be able to see the cogs turning that drive your consciousness and predict what choice you'll make doesn't negate that you're making that choice IMO. Would you deny that your consciousness exists too if it were discovered that the process that drives/creates your consciousness is completely deterministic?

I still don't see what you'd specifically add here to make it a "real" choice? Your analogy with dictators doesn't help me here - we've already established that we can assume there are things your brain does in which you don't have a choice right?

 

[Angilion]

You are actually choosing though, it is your conscious self that is making the decision - just because some observer might, in theory, be able to see the cogs turning that drive your consciousness and predict what choice you'll make doesn't negate that you're making that choice IMO. Would you deny that your consciousness exists too if it were discovered that the process that drives/creates your consciousness is completely deterministic?

I still don't see what you'd specifically add here to make it a "real" choice? Your analogy with dictators doesn't help me here - we've already established that we can assume there are things your brain does in which you don't have a choice right?

OK, I give up. I can't think of any more ways to say why not having a choice is not having a choice. You're not actually choosing when you what you will do is predetermined. There is only 1 option - the predetermined one. A "choice" of 1 option is not a choice.

As for consciousness, I don't know if it exists if it is deterministic. It's less clear than whether or not a choice exists. What is consciousness? Would it be a simulation of consciousness if it is deterministic? Is there a difference?

 

[dowie]

OK, I give up. I can't think of any more ways to say why not having a choice is not having a choice. You're not actually choosing when you what you will do is predetermined. There is only 1 option - the predetermined one. A "choice" of 1 option is not a choice.

As for consciousness, I don't know if it exists if it is deterministic. It's less clear than whether or not a choice exists. What is consciousness? Would it be a simulation of consciousness if it is deterministic? Is there a difference?

I'm not sure what you'd mean by a simulation here - surely a simulation would be someone else trying to replicate it elsewhere, which could be another entity or instance of you which is also conscious. Consciousness is sentience, your self-awareness - that inner voice inside your head that is currently experiencing the world, that might well be deterministic and entirely predictable - I mean it kind of goes hand in hand with free will being so tbh... since free will is surely a result of your conscious choices.

I don't personally think that the universe is deterministic, I'm open to it being so but it doesn't seem to be (based on our current understanding) - whether or not the brain is deterministic is another matter (what we currently understand about the brain so far is all deterministic) but in a (what we think is) a non-deterministic universe then I'd not rule out there being non-determinism affecting aspects of consciousness or indeed choice. but overall I don't think it matters either way whether it (or indeed the universe itself) is deterministic or not.

I guess we'll have to agree to disagree on the choice aspect, I'm still no clearer on what needs to be added to make what to me seems like a choice already a "real" choice.

 

[SexyGreyFox]

No I'm a slave to money just like everyone else.

then you have freewill to do what you want with it.

 

[Angilion]

I'm not sure what you'd mean by a simulation here - surely a simulation would be someone else trying to replicate it elsewhere, which could be another entity or instance of you which is also conscious. Consciousness is sentience, your self-awareness - that inner voice inside your head that is currently experiencing the world, that might well be deterministic and entirely predictable - I mean it kind of goes hand in hand with free will being so tbh... since free will is surely a result of your conscious choices.

A simulation wouldn't be someone else trying to replicate it elsewhere. In this case, the simulation would be running in/on your brain. If your consciousness is the result of deterministic activity in your brain, is it significantly different to a program on a computer modelling something? Is it consciousness or a simulation of consciousness? Does that distinction matter in this context? Being aware of yourself is as subjective as it gets, so I think the distinction doesn't matter.

I don't personally think that the universe is deterministic, I'm open to it being so but it doesn't seem to be (based on our current understanding) - whether or not the brain is deterministic is another matter (what we currently understand about the brain so far is all deterministic) but in a (what we think is) a non-deterministic universe then I'd not rule out there being non-determinism affecting aspects of consciousness or indeed choice. but overall I don't think it matters either way whether it (or indeed the universe itself) is deterministic or not.

I think we don't know anywhere near enough to know whether or not the universe or our brains are deterministic and probably never will. But I do think that it matters. What we currently understand about the brain is deterministic, but that was also true of what we understood about the universe for a while. There's a lot we don't know about both.

I guess we'll have to agree to disagree on the choice aspect, I'm still no clearer on what needs to be added to make what to me seems like a choice already a "real" choice.

And I'm still no clearer on what makes a total inability to do anything other than what is predetermined a choice.

I make a distinction between being able to choose between different options and not being able to choose between different options but thinking (incorrectly) that you can. That does indeed seem like a choice, but I make a distinction between "is a choice" and "seems like a choice". You don't make that distinction. I suppose it could be said that your position is sort of the relativistic position on the subject - the observer's frame of reference is what matters.

 

[dowie]

A simulation wouldn't be someone else trying to replicate it elsewhere. In this case, the simulation would be running in/on your brain. If your consciousness is the result of deterministic activity in your brain, is it significantly different to a program on a computer modelling something? Is it consciousness or a simulation of consciousness? Does that distinction matter in this context? Being aware of yourself is as subjective as it gets, so I think the distinction doesn't matter.

I'm not sure what distinction you're trying to make here or why your actual consciousness would be defined as a simulation here?

I think we don't know anywhere near enough to know whether or not the universe or our brains are deterministic and probably never will. But I do think that it matters. What we currently understand about the brain is deterministic, but that was also true of what we understood about the universe for a while. There's a lot we don't know about both.

True, I agree, I'm just referring to our current understanding.

And I'm still no clearer on what makes a total inability to do anything other than what is predetermined a choice.

A decision is being made, by some conscious entity to choose one thing over another say - ergo a choice is being made.

I make a distinction between being able to choose between different options and not being able to choose between different options but thinking (incorrectly) that you can. That does indeed seem like a choice, but I make a distinction between "is a choice" and "seems like a choice". You don't make that distinction. I suppose it could be said that your position is sort of the relativistic position on the subject - the observer's frame of reference is what matters.

I'm still no clearer on what distinction you're trying to make - what gets added here to make something a "real" choice? As in what non-deterministic process needs to be added or understood here to allow for a "real" choice in our brains given they're currently understood to be deterministic? What does "real" choice look like?