Free will

[..] I'm still no clearer on what distinction you're trying to make - what gets added here to make something a "real" choice? As in what non-deterministic process needs to be added or understood here to allow for a "real" choice in our brains given they're currently understood to be deterministic? What does "real" choice look like?

There's no point us continuing this. I think that a situation in which a person has only one possible course of action can't be them having a choice. You think that it can be. There's no common ground. We may as well agree to disagree.
 
There's no point us continuing this. I think that a situation in which a person has only one possible course of action can't be them having a choice. You think that it can be. There's no common ground. We may as well agree to disagree.

Fair enough, I don't see it the way you've framed it - you can have multiple possible courses of action and make a choice to follow one even if some theoretical observer can see that you were going to make that choice based on your brain and/or the universe being deterministic. I don't know what needs to be added to that process of making a choice in order to make a choice "real" and no one seems to be able to tell me.

I guess we fundamentally disagree on what constitutes a choice here and so this becomes rather circular, am happy to agree to disagree. :)
 
Fair enough, I don't see it the way you've framed it - you can have multiple possible courses of action and make a choice to follow one even if some theoretical observer can see that you were going to make that choice based on your brain and/or the universe being deterministic. I don't know what needs to be added to that process of making a choice in order to make a choice "real" and no one seems to be able to tell me.

I guess we fundamentally disagree on what constitutes a choice here and so this becomes rather circular, am happy to agree to disagree. :)
But then, say you made the "wrong" choice, and later come to deeply regret it.

In a deterministic universe, you really had no choice no alternative outcome. You, your thoughts, your experiences, they all followed a path that could never be altered. From the dawn of the world, there was 1 path and 1 path only that could exist. Your parents could only ever have lived their lives the way they did; you could only ever have lived your life the way you did.

All people, all life, all matter and energy - just cogs in a machine, like a watch.

You may as well regret the fact that 2 + 2 always equals 4, as regret any decision you ever made. You could never have decided any different. You couldn't have bet on black instead of red. You couldn't have chosen to marry that other girl. You couldn't have avoided hitting that kid that jumped out in the road. The kid was always going to jump out, he couldn't change his course of action any more than you could.

Nothing in your life could ever have been any different, any more than 2 + 2 could ever equal anything other than 4.

So then, in such a universe, what is free will? Is the concept of free will meaningless or still meaningful?

As we said previously, almost all computer programs make choices, from the simplest to the most complex. We don't ascribe their behaviour to "free will". We also tend to hope that their behaviour is 100% predictable.
 
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So then, in such a universe, what is free will? Is the concept of free will meaningless or still meaningful?

I think it is still meaningful just as consciousness is still meaningful. I mean even in a universe that isn't deterministic (as ours currently doesn't seem to be) your brain can still be deterministic (our current understanding of the brain doesn't include any non-deterministic aspects so far AFAIK).

Are you not still meaningful - like you, your conscious self if the brain or the entire universe is deterministic?

As we said previously, almost all computer programs make choices, from the simplest to the most complex. We don't ascribe their behaviour to "free will". We also tend to hope that their behaviour is 100% predictable.

There are a couple of issues here - firstly computer programs aren't necessarily 100% predictable and that isn't necessarily something we tend to hope for, you can add in some randomness if you like - yet that randomness doesn't equate to free will, right?

Secondly, a (current) computer/computer program isn't a sentient being - a computer program making a decision isn't free will in the same way that your brain controlling your breathing while you sleep isn't free will. these are processes running along without any involvement of a conscious/sentient being. Your consciousness pretty much shuts down when you sleep, aside from some period of replaying memories, dreaming etc.. ditto to when you go under general anesthetic etc..

That doesn't negate that in the future we could have a sentient computer that does have consciousness/is self-aware and, in its conscious state, make decisions for itself i.e. have free will. I don't see that there need be any hard requirement for such a computer/program to not be deterministic in order to achieve consciousness and/or have free will just as our own brains seem to be deterministic.
 
In a deterministic world, both a human being and a computer program can be defined by a set of mathematical equations/formula, because that's all they are. Complex, sure, but nothing more than maths.

Being conscious doesn't change that. Even being sentient doesn't change that.

Sure you get to experience things, but that alone doesn't give you free will. You even get to think and reason, but that alone doesn't get you free will.

If there is only one path from the beginning of the world until now (and beyond), then what does free will even mean..
 
Even computer programs don't do truly random things - none the less random number generation is a huge consideration of itself and at best an approximation of random - the simplest ones are just a long repeating pattern modulated by time.

The only reason computer programs do something "unpredictable" is due to not having all the data - any program outcome is completely predictable if you have the full data of the environment they are running in - the more "unpredictable" outcomes are due to things like faulty memory causing corruption or CPU hardware bugs, etc. which are all things possible to take into account if you have all the data.
 
A thought experiment, for anyone to answer:

There are three doors in front of you. The doors are controlled from an app. You must use the app. You must open a door. You can open one door and only one door - after opening one door, the app deletes itself.

There are three buttons on the app. Each of the buttons will open door number 2. You cannot possibly open any door other than door number 2.

If you don't know that fact, does that mean you have a choice of which door to open despite the fact that you must open door number 2 and have no other possible course of action? Does being unaware of the fact that you will always open door number 2 and thus thinking (incorrectly) that you could do something else make the fixed course of action a choice?
 
[...]
If there is only one path from the beginning of the world until now (and beyond), then what does free will even mean..

Well, you could also say what does consciousness mean?

You're not just experiencing things though, *you* or your conscious self is making decisions - that they could in theory be predicted doesn't change that.

Even computer programs don't do truly random things - none the less random number generation is a huge consideration of itself and at best an approximation of random - the simplest ones are just a long repeating pattern modulated by time.

They can do random things, you can give a program a source of randomness if you like, doesn't have to be pseudorandom.

The only reason computer programs do something "unpredictable" is due to not having all the data - any program outcome is completely predictable if you have the full data of the environment they are running in - the more "unpredictable" outcomes are due to things like faulty memory causing corruption or CPU hardware bugs, etc. which are all things possible to take into account if you have all the data.

Nope not necessarily, I think you're taking quite a narrow view here a computer doing something unpredictable isn't dependent on a lack of data or some fault with the hardware, if there is some randomness in a program/decision (see for example random exploration of an RL agent) then they can do all sorts of unpredictable moves, come up with things that people wouldn't have considered/ thought of even when playing a relatively simple game say.

A thought experiment, for anyone to answer:

There are three doors in front of you. The doors are controlled from an app. You must use the app. You must open a door. You can open one door and only one door - after opening one door, the app deletes itself.

There are three buttons on the app. Each of the buttons will open door number 2. You cannot possibly open any door other than door number 2.

If you don't know that fact, does that mean you have a choice of which door to open despite the fact that you must open door number 2 and have no other possible course of action? Does being unaware of the fact that you will always open door number 2 and thus thinking (incorrectly) that you could do something else make the fixed course of action a choice?

You've got a slight flaw/contradiction in your question - the doors (plural) aren't controlled from the app, only one of them is.

Your app doesn't give you a meaningful choice beyond picking a button at random - you have no knowledge of what the buttons correspond to - this would still be the case if they were wired up to control different doors - your choice doesn't map to specific doors but just to which button to press.
 
They can do random things, you can give a program a source of randomness if you like, doesn't have to be pseudorandom.

Sure you can sample white noise, etc. but it will behave the same if you feed it the same sample and even white noise isn't truly random itself (if we go the whole deterministic universe thing).

Nope not necessarily, I think you're taking quite a narrow view here a computer doing something unpredictable isn't dependent on a lack of data or some fault with the hardware, if there is some randomness in a program/decision (see for example random exploration of an RL agent) then they can do all sorts of unpredictable moves, come up with things that people wouldn't have considered/ thought of even when playing a relatively simple game say.

Nope - if you know all the input parameters for a program the output will always be predictable - the unpredictability you speak of comes from not fully knowing every aspect of the environment the program is executing in and with.
 
Sure you can sample white noise, etc. but it will behave the same if you feed it the same sample and even white noise isn't truly random itself (if we go the whole deterministic universe thing).

I didn't specify white noise.

Sure if in the future it is found that the universe is deterministic and we have an explanation of quantum phenomenon that is currently understood to be random then no you can't have randomness, but according to our current understanding of Physics, you can.

Nope - if you know all the input parameters for a program the output will always be predictable - the unpredictability comes from not fully knowing every aspect of the environment the program is executing in and with.

Nope, that's just false, you can have a non-deterministic program by design, simply add some randomness to some decision and voila.
 
I didn't specify white noise.

Sure if in the future it is found that the universe is deterministic and we have an explanation of quantum phenomenon that is currently understood to be random then no you can't have randomness, but according to our current understanding of Physics, you can.



Nope, that's just false, you can have a non-deterministic program by design, simply add some randomness to some decision and voila.

There are various hardware attempts to generate a true random number - but that does then depend on whether whatever that samples to generate a number is deterministic or not and if you can reproduce the input to the random number generator then you can always determine the outcome of the program.

Software is not really a good example here as it depends far too much on the nature of our universe as to whether a program's functionality is truly unpredictable or not when it depends on random input.
 
There are various hardware attempts to generate a true random number - but that does then depend on whether whatever that samples to generate a number is deterministic or not and if you can reproduce the input to the random number generator then you can always determine the outcome of the program.

You can't reproduce the input if it is random. If you're going to claim that randomness is impossible because you believe the universe is deterministic then that's somewhat different and this whole point is moot then but if we're talking about randomness being possible then you can have randomness in a computer program.

Software is not really a good example here as it depends far too much on the nature of our universe as to whether a program's functionality is truly unpredictable or not when it depends on random input.

Well yeah, but you can say that about anything - if the universe is deterministic then there is no randomness.
 
No link and run from my side - you were the one who apparently dropped out of the thread and then returned.

I came back in because I saw other people, @FoxEye, @Angilion, @Bouton Aide etc., falling into the same circular argument we'd just had and was trying to save everyone from re-stating the same position over and over again. I clearly failed!

My position is fine by itself, I don't see the need to label it per se, but you seemed oblivious to the idea that people would even have these positions so it was helpful to highlight that it is hardly some random, obscure notion in general.

No, it was never that I was oblivious to the ideas of compatibilism but rather an interest in why you specifically hold that view and the basis for it.

This may come as a surprise (and at the risk of massaging your ego), but despite your posting style being somewhat frustrating at times, I do value your input on these forums. You're often contrarian, and you come across as knowledgable about a broad range of subjects, so it's good to get an alternative viewpoint. I sometimes find it difficult to formulate the right question to get a satisfactory answer from you, and I'm clearly not alone, as I'm sure you're well aware. :p :)

So when you say something like 'questions of determinism are misguided in relation to free will', it piqued my curiosity.

I've gone back to the start of the thread to see if I'd missed anything the first time around, and I've had the following reflections:

1) It seems odd for a compatibilist to completely reject determinism's relevance concerning free will. Without determinism, there would be nothing for free will to be compatible with. You could say that you think free will exists whether the universe is deterministic or not, but you're still framing the question in terms of determinism, so to state that it's not at all relevant is…odd.

2) You seem quite happy to use the 'layman's' definition of free will, but that's the definition most compatibilists (Dennett et al.) disagree with. If you were defining free will as they do, it would be easier to understand your position, but you seem to be happy with an incompatibilist's definition of free will and come away with a compatibilist conclusion.

3) Connected to the above, you say that we hold each other accountable for our actions regardless of the existence of free will, but then say that the practical application isn’t relevant to your argument.

4) You initially brought up the outside observer and then kept saying it's not important. The whole point about the outside observer predicting your actions is that it would prove determinism. To an incompatibilist, that’s all the evidence they need to disprove free will because it's literally the foundation of their argument. I take my share of responsibility for us spending so long on this particular dead-end of the discussion but:

5) You seem to have a firm grasp on the subject — so there was no need for me, or @FoxEye, or @Angilion to reiterate the incompatibilist point of view over and over again. You could have just addressed the issue directly with an argument for compatibilism (as Dennett does in the link I posted), but instead, you seem happy to keep going around in circles. Our discussion and your discussion with @Angilion are so similar it's painful, but they both could have been summed up in a couple of sentences, as demonstrated in point 4 above. I'm not sure if it's an attempt at some form of Socratic questioning, whereby you get people to reverse their opinion by continuously asking questions, but it's rather tiring, especially when it transpires that you're fully versed in the argument people are trying to present to you.

All of which is why I said:

Sure, but a link-and-run to a rather dense academic summary doesn’t tell us what you think about it, which arguments within that summary you agree/disagree with, or why you believe that take is more valid than the other alternative theories.

*Edit* Just to add to the above — if a priest throws a bible at me, that single act it’s unlikely to convert me to Christianity. I need it to be interpreted, I need it explaining, and I need persuading.

You took issue with 'link-and-run' without addressing the rest of the post.

For my part, I accept that I spent far too long stating the incompatibilist position and not enough time acknowledging the alternatives. Reading it back, I can see why you might think I hadn’t considered those ideas. :)
 
I sometimes find it difficult to formulate the right question to get a satisfactory answer from you, and I'm clearly not alone, as I'm sure you're well aware. :p :)

I believe the correct term is "dowiehole" :D

(it's often because things get misrepresented when some details are important tbh...)

1) It seems odd for a compatibilist to completely reject determinism's relevance concerning free will. Without determinism, there would be nothing for free will to be compatible with. You could say that you think free will exists whether the universe is deterministic or not, but you're still framing the question in terms of determinism, so to state that it's not at all relevant is…odd.

2) You seem quite happy to use the 'layman's' definition of free will, but that's the definition most compatibilists (Dennett et al.) disagree with. If you were defining free will as they do, it would be easier to understand your position, but you seem to be happy with an incompatibilist's definition of free will and come away with a compatibilist conclusion.

I initially avoided using labels though as I'd rather just have a discussion in plain language without preconceptions or trying to put people's views into boxes etc... I don't think there needs to be expectations that because one person believes A they should also believe B because others who believe A also believe B etc.. that is something that I think can be unhelpful.

4) You initially brought up the outside observer and then kept saying it's not important. The whole point about the outside observer predicting your actions is that it would prove determinism. To an incompatibilist, that’s all the evidence they need to disprove free will because it's literally the foundation of their argument. I take my share of responsibility for us spending so long on this particular dead-end of the discussion but:

No, my point wasn't that the observer wasn't important - my point what that you were spending time introducing some new observer and I didn't think *that* was important given that I had already accepted the notion of some theoretical observer in a deterministic universe. I didn't see what spending more time adding in details about some limited observer added if the idea of one had already been accepted.

5) You seem to have a firm grasp on the subject — so there was no need for me, or @FoxEye, or @Angilion to reiterate the incompatibilist point of view over and over again.

But I'm not going to make any preconceived judgements about what your specific views are, I wanted to know what you believe not just put you into some box because you're starting to sound similar to some other people. :)

And along with that if I'm putting forth my views then I'll state them, I don't feel the need to necessarily associate myself or disassociate myself with some other labels or views other people have.
 
[..] 2) You seem quite happy to use the 'layman's' definition of free will, but that's the definition most compatibilists (Dennett et al.) disagree with. If you were defining free will as they do, it would be easier to understand your position, but you seem to be happy with an incompatibilist's definition of free will and come away with a compatibilist conclusion. [..]

I think that's the crux of the matter - the definition of free will. Also, as a result, the definition of choice. Specifically, whether or not believing you have a choice when you don't (because what you do is predetermined and therefore not under your control) counts as having a choice. Is choice objective or subjective?
 
You have freewill, you can post what you like however depending what you post could get you banned, it's your choice.

But is it really my choice? What if it is determined that I post a picture of my cat and therefore I can't do anything else? Is it a choice if I can't choose?

If I had a cat. Which I don't.
 
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