Oh; guess I'll need to do the paper part then as well.
If the system is administered honestly, doesn't ever suffer from function creep, isn't ever quietly changed and is secure (and do you want to buy a bridge?) then the type 1 data sharing does have some benefit to you. That data sharing is supposed to be only within the NHS and only for patient care purposes. Supposed to be. Stuff like a hospital having immediate access to your GP records and vice versa, which might well be important. The type 2 (national/international) is a different kettle of fish - that's to benefit whoever the data is sold to, not patients.
That last sentence is quite sinister!
Would you expect anything else from a UK government? Or almost any other country's government? Maybe every country's government. Even if they didn't intend to use it, they'd still give themselves the power to do so.
I'm not adverse to fully anonymised data being shared for medical research purposes but who can trust this current government (or any flavoured incumbent) to ensure and keep the data secure but then not to also sell it on to anyone and for any purpose!
True, but it's worse than that. The data is, as explicitly stated in the official page about the scheme,
not anonymised. It is explicitly stated to be identifiable. On top of that, "anonymised" data is at least almost always only anonymous if no other relevant data is available. How likely is that nowadays? The funniest example I know of was when a politician in the USA was backing "anonymised" medical data being shared and someone who had some understanding of what that really meant extracted that politician's record from the "anonymised" data using nothing more than the publically available voter records. That was a while ago too - it's a lot easier nowadays since there's a lot more spying on everyone.
Here's the simplest way to sell "anonymous" data that's not at all anonymous:
I have a load of data about lots of people. For publicity reasons I can only sell you "anonymised" data. So I generate two sets of data. The first set is the full data but with the people's names replaced by codes. That's "anonymous" as it doesn't identify people. Then I sell you another set of data, which contains people's names and the code associated with each name. That's OK too because the dataset doesn't contain any data about anyone. Combine the two and you've got the complete and completely identifiable data. But I only sold you "anonymised" data.
In reality it's usually a bit more complex than that, but the principle is the same - combining datasets to de-anonymise data.
It's also irrelevant in this case as the patient data that will be sold under this scheme is explicitly stated to be identifiable confidential patient data. Not anonymous or even "anonymous".