Notwithstanding that EFTA does not have a treaty with the EU, much less one
that maintains a principle of free movement with the EU - and that the UK is
not currently a member of EFTA so it could hardly seek to remain in it - the
meaning is clear enough. Ukip was rejecting any form of agreement which
involved free movement provisions. Despite the difficulties and potential
penalties, its preference was for what amounted to the WTO option, with
ambitions of negotiating a bespoke free trade agreement once the UK had left
the EU.
Here, it is unlikely that the EU would settle for any formal free trade agreement
without some provision for freedom of movement. Within the EU and the EEA,
the EU regards all its "freedoms" as a non-negotiable part of the Single Market
acquis. This has been reaffirmed by the European Commission many times, not
least by vice-president Viviane Reding. She stated at the end of 2013: "if
Britain wants to stay a part of the Single Market, free movement would
continue to apply".
349 As a member of the EEA, Britain would be obliged to
permit free movement of workers from the entire area, with its implicit freedom
to immigrate. Thus, there is a very real conflict between those who regard the
need to limit immigration from EU Member States as paramount, and those
who see an overwhelming requirement to protect the Single Market by
continued participation in the EEA as a necessary condition to win the
referendum.
Whilst we aver that it would be impossible to win a referendum with a plan
which seeks to reject the EU's freedom of movement provisions, many people
regard that rejection as the main aim of withdrawal.
Those who hold this position seem unable to understand that leaving the EU
does not, in itself, bring immigration under control and that, even within the
EU, it is possible to exert far greater control over immigration than is currently
exercised. They also fail to acknowledge that the initial exit settlement is only
an interim measure, adopted for the purpose of easing our rapid exit from the
EU. Once we are no longer members, it will be possible to work on a longerterm
settlement which deals with the freedom of movement provisions.
Those who argue for their version of the perfect solution might wait decades
before they can convince their fellow countrymen to agree with them, to deliver
a majority in a referendum. A less ambitious solution, which keeps us in the
Single Market and allows freedom of movement (but with improved controls)
might deliver a successful referendum outcome.
This we see as a far better strategy. A temporary continuation of freedom of
movement in order to secure our exit is preferable to an inflexible stance which
will wreck our chances of winning the referendum, leaving us burdened with
unabated freedom of movement for the foreseeable future. A short-term
compromise is the best way forward.